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For more than two decades, internet service providers (ISPs) in 
the United States, the European Union (EU), and many other countries 
have been shielded from copyright liability under “safe harbor” rules. 
These rules apply to ISPs who did not know about or participate in 
user-uploaded infringements and who take infringing content down 
after receiving notice from rights holders. Major copyright industry 
groups were never satisfied with these safe harbors, and their 
dissatisfaction has become more strident over time as online 
infringements have grown to scale.
Responding to copyright industry complaints, the EU in 2019 
adopted its Directive on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital 
Single Market. In particular, the Directive’s Article 17 places much 
stricter obligations on for-profit ISPs that host large amounts of user 
contents. Article 17 is internally contradictory, deeply ambiguous, and 
harmful to small and medium-sized companies as well as to user 
freedoms of expression. Moreover, Article 17 may well violate the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
In the United States, Congress commenced a series of hearings in 
2020 on the safe harbor rules now codified as 17 U.S.C. § 512 of the 
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA). In May 2020, the U.S. 
Copyright Office issued its long-awaited study on Section 512, which 
recommended several significant changes to existing safe harbor rules. 
The Study’s almost exclusively pro–copyright industry stances on 
reform of virtually every aspect of the rules notably shortchanges other 
stakeholder interests.
Congress should take a balanced approach in considering any 
changes to the DMCA safe harbor rules. Any meaningful reform of ISP 
* Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law, Berkeley Law School. This 
Article is adapted from my written testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual 
Property Subcommittee on March 10, 2020, available at https://www.judiciary.senate.gov/imo
/media/doc/Samuelson%20Testimony.pdf. It has been substantially revised to comment on the 
May 2020 Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study. I wish to thank Kathryn Hashimoto for ex-
cellent research support for that testimony and this Article, as well as Annemarie Bridy, Gwen 
Hinze, Martin Husovec, Daphne Keller, Paul Keller, Corynne McSherry, João Pedro Quintais, 
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liability rules should consider the interests of a wide range of 
stakeholders. This includes U.S.-based Internet platforms, smaller and 
medium-sized ISPs, startups, and the hundreds of millions of Internet 
users who create and enjoy user-generated content (UGC) uploaded to 
these platforms, as well as the interests of major copyright industries 
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Introduction
For more than two decades, the United States and EU have had compat-
ible “safe harbor” rules limiting the liability of internet service providers 
(ISPs), such as Facebook and YouTube, that host content uploaded by their 
users. As long as these ISPs were neither complicit in their users’ copyright-
infringing activities nor aware that user-uploaded content was infringing, 
the safe harbor rules relieved them from liability for user infringements. 
Under these rules, ISPs would become liable for user infringement if they 
failed to remove or disable access to infringing materials after receiving de-
tailed notices from copyright owners or their agents about the location of 
specific infringing materials. In the United States, this “notice-and-
takedown” regime was adopted as part of the Digital Millennium Copyright 
Act (DMCA) of 1998.
1
In the EU, this was accomplished as part of its Di-
rective on E-Commerce in 2000.
2
Many other countries have followed the 
U.S.-and-EU-led approach to ISP liability.
3
Major copyright industry groups would have preferred stronger ISP lia-
bility rules in national laws back in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
4
But 
they reluctantly went along with the safe harbor rules as part of legislative 
compromises about updating copyright rules for the digital age.
5
Over time, 
the scale and scope of online copyright-related activity, both legitimate (for 
example, user-generated content such as remix parodies) and illegitimate 
(online piracy), has far surpassed what policymakers in the United States 
and EU could have imagined. Although ISPs have sometimes been held in-
directly liable for contributing to user infringement,
6
the safe harbor rules 
1. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201–02, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (1998) (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512).
2. Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 8 June 
2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, in Particular Electronic 
Commerce, in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1 [hereinafter E-Commerce Directive].
3. See, e.g., Copyright Law in Foreign Jurisdictions: How Are Other Countries Han-
dling Digital Piracy?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on 
the Judiciary, 116th Cong. 1–2 (2020) [hereinafter Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hear-
ing] (statement of Justin Hughes, Professor of Law, Loyola Marymount University); id. at 4 
(statement of Matt Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association).
4. See JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 135 (2006) (describing content owner 
groups as favoring strict liability rules against ISPs). The long, complicated bargaining pro-
cess leading to passage of the DMCA is recounted in detail by Professor Litman. See id. at 
122–45.
5. See id. at 135 (“It soon became clear to content owners, however, that the legisla-
tion could not move without a solution to the problem of Internet service provider liability.”).
6. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–
30 (2005) (holding peer-to-peer file-sharing service liable for inducing user infringements).
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have protected ISPs even when they were generally aware of some user in-
fringement on their sites.
7
Dissatisfaction with the safe harbors has caused 
copyright industry groups and some individual creators to urge legislators to 
stiffen the existing rules.
8
Copyright industry complaints about online piracy contributed to the 
European Commission’s 2016 decision to propose a new directive that, 
among other things, would place much stricter obligations on for-profit ISPs 
that host large amounts of user content,
9
even if these sites host lawful user-
generated content (UGC). The Commission hoped these new rules would 
induce ISPs to engage in more licensing of EU copyrights and reduce user-
uploaded infringements by creating incentives for these ISPs to adopt auto-
mated content recognition tools.
10
In April 2019, the EU finalized its Di-
rective on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market (DSM 
Directive).
11
The revised and renumbered Article 17 directs EU member 
states to adopt strict liability rules for a subset of ISPs referred to in the di-
rective as “online content-sharing service providers.”
12
Under the new rules, 
these services will be directly liable for any infringing files that users upload 
to their sites. The services must make “best efforts” to obtain licenses from 
copyright owners and to ensure that protected works for which copyright 
owners have provided relevant information cannot be uploaded to the ser-
vice’s sites; moreover, the services must make best efforts to keep the mate-
rials from being reuploaded after they are taken down. (This is commonly 
referred to as a “notice-and-staydown” procedure.)
13
Article 17 was highly 
7. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 32–33 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(hosting service not liable for infringing uploads of users despite general knowledge of some 
infringements on its site).
8. See, e.g., Niva Elkin-Koren et al., Is It Time to Abolish Safe Harbor? When Rheto-
ric Clouds Policy Goals, 31 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 1, 10 (2020).
9. Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Coun-
cil on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, COM (2016) 593 final (Sept. 14, 2016) [herein-
after Proposed DSM Directive]. The Proposed DSM Directive largely ignored that a substan-
tial proportion of user-uploaded content hosted by ISPs is UGC. See discussion of UGC infra
notes 76–77, 193–203 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., Annemarie Bridy, The Price of Closing the “Value Gap”: How the Music 
Industry Hacked EU Copyright Reform, 22 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 323, 326–33 (2020) 
(explaining and critiquing the “value gap” rationale for the adoption of Article 17).
11. Council Directive (EU) 2019/790 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 
17 April 2019 on Copyright and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market, 2019 O.J. (L 
130) [hereinafter DSM Directive]. My focus in this Article is on the copyright implications of 
Article 17; the rules it establishes also apply to the online hosting of contents that are subject 
to related rights protections (such as the exclusive rights EU law provides in broadcasts and 
sound recordings) and sui generis database rights.
12. Id. art. 2(6) (defining this term).
13. Id. art. 17(4). For an excellent comparative analysis of notice-and-takedown and 
notice-and-staydown regimes, see Martin Husovec, The Promises of Algorithmic Copyright 
Enforcement: Takedown or Staydown? Which is Superior? And Why?, 42 COLUM. J.L. &
ARTS 53 (2018).
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controversial in the EU, barely garnering a majority vote in support at the 
EU Parliament, even after adoption of key amendments to protect user in-
terests to address critics’ concerns. EU member states have until June 2021 
to transpose Article 17 into their national laws.
Copyright industry criticisms of the DMCA safe harbors also contribut-
ed to the U.S. Copyright Office’s decision in late 2015 to initiate a policy 
study of these rules.
14
In May 2020, the Office published a study recom-
mending several significant changes to these rules, although it did not en-
dorse an Article 17-like notice-and-staydown regime, as some copyright in-
dustry representatives had urged.
15
Even before the Office’s Study became 
public, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Intellectual Property Subcommit-
tee commenced a series of hearings about the DMCA safe harbors.
16
On 
March 10, this Subcommittee heard from two panels of experts on how oth-
er jurisdictions are dealing with online piracy. My testimony at this hearing 
explained why Article 17 of the DSM Directive should not serve as a model 
for any Congressional reconsideration of the DMCA safe harbors.
17
14. See Section 512 Study: Notice and Request for Public Comment, 80 Fed. Reg. 
81862, 81862 (Dec. 31, 2015). Following two Notices of Inquiry that sought public comments 
and several public roundtables, the Office issued its Report. See U.S. COPYRIGHT OFFICE,
SECTION 512 OF TITLE 17: A REPORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS 1 (May 2020) [here-
inafter SECTION 512 STUDY].
15. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 186–93; see, e.g., U.S. Copyright Of-
fice, Transcript, Section 512 Study Roundtable (Apr. 8, 2019) (comments of Mary Rasen-
berger, Authors Guild; and Eric Cady, Independent Film and Television Alliance), 
https://www.copyright.gov/policy/section512/public-roundtable/transcript_04-08-2019.pdf 
(urging adoption of notice-and-staydown rules).
16. See, e.g., Eileen McDermott, Senate IP Subcommittee Kicks Off Year-Long Review 
of Digital Millennium Copyright Act, IP WATCHDOG (Feb. 13, 2020), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/02/13/senate-ip-subcommittee-kicks-off-year-long-
review-digital-millennium-copyright-act/id=118866. The first hearing was held on February 
11, 2020. See The Digital Millennium Copyright Act at 22: What Is It, Why Was It Enacted, 
and Where Are We Now?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. 
Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter DMCA at 22 Hearing]. On June 2, 
2020, a third hearing occurred. See Is the DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown System Working in 
the 21st Century?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 116th Cong. (2020) [hereinafter DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing]. These 
were followed by two more Senate hearings held on July 28, 2020 and December 15, 2020, 
respectively. See How Does the DMCA Contemplate Limitations and Exceptions Like Fair 
Use?: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intell. Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th 
Cong. (2020); The Role of Private Agreements and Existing Technology in Curbing Online 
Piracy: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
116th Cong. (2020). The House also held a hearing after the Copyright Office issued its § 512
Report. See Copyright and the Internet in 2020: Reactions to the Copyright Office’s Report on 
the Efficacy of 17 U.S.C. § 512 After Two Decades: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on the Ju-
diciary, 116th Cong. (2020).
17. Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Pamela 
Samuelson, Professor of Law, University of California, Berkeley). On December 22, 2020, 
Sen. Thom Tillis, then-Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Intellec-
tual Property, released the first discussion draft of legislation to reform the DMCA, soliciting 
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This Article revisits and expands upon key points from that testimony 
and offers a critique of the Copyright Office’s recently issued Section 512 
Study. Part I reviews the circumstances that led to the creation of these safe 
harbors and the role the United States has played in making the notice-and-
takedown regime an international standard. Part II shows that Article 17 of 
the DSM is internally contradictory, deeply ambiguous, and harmful to 
small and medium-sized companies as well as to user freedoms of expres-
sion. It also discusses why Article 17 may well violate the European Charter 
of Fundamental Rights.
Part III recommends that Congress take a balanced approach in consid-
ering any changes to the DMCA notice-and-takedown rules. It critiques key 
recommendations for changes to the DMCA safe harbors in the Copyright 
Office’s Section 512 Study. Any meaningful reform of ISP liability rules 
should consider the interests of a wide range of stakeholders, including 
highly successful U.S.-based internet platforms, smaller and medium-sized 
ISPs, startups, the many millions of internet users who share their own crea-
tions through these platforms, hundreds of millions of internet users who 
enjoy these creations, as well as the interests of major copyright industries 
and individual creators who have been dissatisfied with the DMCA safe 
harbor rules. The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study purports to take a 
comprehensive and balanced view in presenting its analysis and recommen-
dations, but on closer reading its almost exclusively pro–copyright industry 
stances on reform of virtually every aspect of § 512 shortchanges several 
other types of stakeholder interests. The Office does not even recognize that 
UGC creators are copyright owners too, whose interests may be adversely 
affected by numerous changes the Section 512 Study would make to ISP li-
ability rules.
I.  ISP Safe Harbors for User Infringements Became an 
International Norm After Adoption of the WCT
In the mid-1990s, when the internet was much less widely used than it 
is today, stakeholders and policymakers engaged in long and complex nego-
tiations to consider the future of copyright law in the digital environment. 
One contentious issue was what, if any, legal liability ISPs should incur for 
copyright-infringing content posted by their users. Prior to the diplomatic 
conference that culminated in the adoption of the WIPO Copyright Treaty 
(WCT), the Clinton Administration published its White Paper on Intellectu-
comments from stakeholders and interested parties by March 5, 2021. See Press Release, Sen. 
Thom Tillis, Tillis Releases Landmark Discussion Draft to Reform the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (Dec. 22, 2020), https://www.tillis.senate.gov/2020/12/tillis-releases-landmark-
discussion-draft-to-reform-the-digital-millennium-copyright-act. Analysis of this discussion 
draft is, unfortunately, beyond the scope and time constraints of this Article.
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al Property and the National Information Infrastructure stating that ISPs 
were and should be liable for user infringements on their sites, a position 
with which ISPs took issue.
18
U.S. officials also proposed this rule for con-
sideration at the WIPO diplomatic conference scheduled in late 1996 to 
consider a possible treaty on digital copyright issues.
19
The strict liability 
position initially proposed by the United States was not met with favor 
among the delegates to the diplomatic conference, however, because it was 
unbalanced and unfair to ISPs insofar as they were unaware of infringing 
materials on their sites.
20
An Agreed Statement to Article 8 of the WCT
21
became the internation-
al norm regarding ISP liability for user infringements of which the ISPs 
were unaware and over which they had no control. It stated that “the mere 
provision of physical facilities for enabling or making a communication 
does not in itself amount to communication within the meaning of this Trea-
ty or the Berne Convention.”
22
Consistent with this position were subse-
quent legislative limitations on ISPs’ liability for infringing acts of their us-
ers about which they lacked knowledge and over which they had no control.
The United States implemented this norm as part of the DMCA in 1998, 
creating a new § 512 of U.S. copyright law to establish four ISP safe har-
bors from monetary and injunctive relief.
23
The U.S. legislative debate over 
ISP liability rules was influenced by a court ruling in Religious Technology 
Center v. Netcom Online Communication Services, Inc.24 It held that an in-
18. BRUCE A. LEHMAN, INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE 
REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 117 (1995).
19. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Big Media Beaten Back, WIRED (Mar. 01, 1997, 
12:00 PM) [hereinafter Samuelson, Big Media], https://www.wired.com/1997/03/netizen-4. 
For a fuller discussion about the differences between the proposed and final treaties on digital 
copyright law, see, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, The U.S. Digital Agenda at WIPO, 37 VA. J.
INT’L L. 369, 370 (1997) [hereinafter Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda].
20. See, e.g., Samuelson, U.S. Digital Agenda, supra note 19, at 387–88.
21. World Intellectual Property Organization [WIPO], Agreed Statement Concerning 
the WIPO Copyright Treaty, at 3, CRNR/DC/96 (Dec. 23, 1996), https://www.wipo.int
/meetings/en/doc_details.jsp?doc_id=2464.
22. Id.
23. Online Copyright Infringement Liability Limitation Act, Title II of Digital Millen-
nium Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 105-304, §§ 201–02, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877 (1998) (codified 
as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 512); see, e.g., Jesse Helms, WIPO COPYRIGHT TREATY AND 
WIPO PERFORMANCES AND PHONOGRAMS TREATY REPORT TO ACCOMPANY TREATY DOC.
106-17, S. EXEC. DOC. NO. 105-25, at 17 (2d Sess. 1998) (referring to the compromise on ISP 
liability at WIPO diplomatic conference that resulted in the Agreed Statement and provisions 
in implementing legislation that set forth “a clear legal framework for rights and responsibili-
ties of ISPs, telephone companies, and copyright holders”). In the United States, ISPs are im-
mune from liability for other tortious acts by users under 47 U.S.C. § 230. See, e.g., JEFF 
KOSSEFF, THE TWENTY-SIX WORDS THAT CREATED THE INTERNET 9–10 (2019).
24. Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-line Commc’n Serv., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 
(N.D. Cal. 1995), cited in H.R. REP. NO. 105-551, at 11 (1998) (“Thus, the bill essentially 
codifies the result in the leading and most thoughtful judicial decision to date [i.e., Netcom].”).
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ternet access provider, Netcom, was not directly liable for a subscriber’s in-
fringement of which it was unaware.
25
Regarding secondary liability, specif-
ically contributory liability, however, the court thought that once RTC noti-
fied Netcom about the presence of infringing content on its network, 
Netcom had a duty to investigate and take down infringing materials if the 
claim was valid. The court thus denied Netcom’s motion for summary 
judgment, ruling that Netcom could be held contributorily liable for sub-
scriber infringements if its failure to act on RTC’s notice materially contrib-
uted to the subscriber’s infringement.
26
In keeping with the Netcom decision, the first safe harbor in § 512 ex-
empts internet access providers from liability for unmodified transitory digi-
tal network communications.
27
The second limits ISP liability for network 
system caching.
28
The third limits liability for ISP storage of contents at the 
direction of the system’s users.
29
The fourth provides a safe harbor to infor-
mation locating tools, such as search engines, that may link or refer to in-
fringing materials.
30
The latter three safe harbors are subject to notice-and-
takedown rules under which ISPs are obliged, after receiving specific notic-
es from copyright owners or their agents about the location of specific in-
fringing materials, to remove or disable access to those materials.
31
Eligibility for the § 512 safe harbors is subject to certain conditions. 
One is that ISPs must adopt and reasonably implement a policy for terminat-
ing the accounts of repeat infringers in appropriate circumstances. Another 
is that ISPs must inform the Copyright Office of the agent the ISPs have 
designated to be the recipients of infringement takedown notices in order to 
be eligible for the § 512(b), (c), and (d) safe harbors.
32
Among the significant safeguards in § 512 for ISPs and their users is 
§ 512(m), which clarifies that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor for or af-
firmatively seek out facts about possible infringing activities. This rule pro-
tects users’ privacy as well as limiting the extent to which ISPs have to be 
25. Id. at 1369–70.
26. Id. at 1381.
27. 17 U.S.C. § 512(a).
28. Id. § 512(b).
29. Id. § 512(c).
30. Id. § 512(d).
31. Id. § 512(b)(2)(E), (c)(1)(C), (d)(3).
32. Id. § 512(c)(2)–(3), 512(i)(1)(A). The designated agent requirement appears to be 
incorporated in § 512(b) and (d) by reference to § 512(c)(3). Subsection (i) also conditions 
safe harbors on the ISP’s accommodation of standard technical measures. See id. § 512(i)(1)–
(2). This condition has yet to be activated because there has been no stakeholder consensus 
about standard technical measures. The Copyright Office intends to initiate discussions with 
stakeholders in an effort to build consensus on such measures in coming years. See SECTION 
512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 176–80.
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on the lookout for infringements.
33
Two further user safeguards are § 512(f), 
which provides a compensatory remedy for users victimized by wrongful 
takedowns, and § 512(g), which obligates ISPs to notify users of takedowns 
done in response to copyright owner demands and establishes a counterno-
tice procedure if users want to contest a copyright infringement claim.
34
The EU adopted a similar set of safe harbors in 2000 through adoption 
of Articles 12 through 15 of its E-Commerce Directive.
35
Numerous other 
countries have followed the United States’ and EU’s leads in adopting simi-
lar safe harbor rules in their national laws.
36
Even without legislation, courts 
in some countries have interpreted their national copyright laws in a manner 
consistent with the DMCA safe harbors.
37
The United States has, moreover, exported DMCA-like ISP safe harbor 
rules through its Free Trade Agreements with numerous nations in Asia, the 
Middle East, and South America.
38
The most recent example is the United 
States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA), which updated the North 
33. 17 U.S.C. § 512(m)(1). However, “red flag” knowledge of infringement will defeat 
eligibility for § 512(c)’s safe harbor. See infra notes 154–57 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of the § 512 “red flag” knowledge rule.
34. 17 U.S.C. § 512(f), (g).
35. E-Commerce Directive, supra note 2. Article 12 is similar to the § 512(a) safe har-
bor; Article 13 is similar to the § 512(b) safe harbor, and Article 14 is similar to § 512(c). The 
E-Commerce Directive does not have safe harbor for search engines or other information lo-
cating tools. Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive established a no-general-obligation-to-
monitor rule. Under the E-Commerce Directive, ISPs are subject to the same notice and 
takedown obligations for tortious acts of their users. Id.
36. See, e.g., Maayan Perel & Niva Elkin-Koren, Accountability in Algorithmic Copy-
right Enforcement, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 473, 477 (2016) (describing notice and takedown 
regimes as “ubiquitous and embedded in the system design of all major intermediaries”). For a 
country-by-country account of laws governing online intermediaries, see Stanford Law School 
Center for Internet and Society, World Intermediary Liability Map (WILMap), CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y, https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu; see also Daphne Keller, Build Your 
Own Intermediary Liability Law: A Kit for Policy Wonks of All Ages, CTR. FOR INTERNET &
SOC’Y (June 11, 2019), http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/publications/build-your-own-
intermediary-liability-law-kit-policy-wonks-all-ages.
37. See, e.g., Joan Barata, Court Holds That Users’ Uploading, Storing, and Down-
loading Activities Do Not in Themselves Constitute Dissemination of Information, CTR. FOR 
INTERNET & SOC’Y (June 11, 2019), https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu/entries/court-holds-
users-uploading-storing-and-downloading-activities-do-not-themselves-constitute (reporting 
on Sohu v. Baidu decision by Singapore court).
38. See, e.g., Free Trade Agreement (FTA) Between Morocco and the United States 
(MUSFTA), CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y (June 15, 2004), https://wilmap.law.stanford.edu
/entries/free-trade-agreement-fta-between-morocco-and-united-sates-musfta; see SECTION 512
STUDY, supra note 14, at 50–51 n.269; see also Gwenith Hinze, A Tale of Two Legal Re-
gimes: An Empirical Investigation into How Copyright Law Shapes Online Service Providers’
Practices and How Online Service Providers Navigate Differences in US and EU Copyright 
Liability 153–54 (Spring 2019) (S.J.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley) (on 
file with UC Berkeley Electronic Theses and Dissertations).
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American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and includes a DMCA-like ISP 
safe harbor provision.
39
Some countries have adopted less strict ISP liability rules than the 
DMCA notice-and-takedown regime. Canada, for instance, has adopted a 
“notice-and-notice” regime to deal with user infringements.
40
As with the 
DMCA takedown safe harbors, the first step of the notice-and-notice proce-
dure directs copyright owners to notify an ISP when they have detected the 
presence and location on the ISP’s site of digital contents in which they own 
rights and in which they have a good faith belief the contents are infring-
ing.
41
The second step calls for the ISP to forward this notice to its subscrib-
er, thereby alerting that person that its internet account was linked to an al-
leged infringement. Beyond this, neither the ISP nor the subscriber has a 
statutory obligation to take down any content from the ISP’s site, although a 
failure to take down infringing contents may result in the subscriber being 
liable in money damages for the infringement.
42
The stated goal of the no-
tice-and-notice regime is to discourage infringement and raise internet us-
ers’ awareness about copyrights.
43
Canada has decided to maintain its no-
tice-and-notice ISP regulations, even though these rules are less strict than 
the DMCA and the USMCA provisions.
44
Major content industry groups were never supportive of DMCA-like 
notice-and-takedown safe harbors. These groups have become ever more 
dissatisfied with the safe harbors over time because the number of online 
infringements has become staggeringly large.
45
The entertainment industry 
39. See, e.g., Ross Bagley, USMCA Set to Export U.S. Copyright Law to North Ameri-
can Neighbors, IP WATCHDOG (Jan. 29, 2020), https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2020/01/29
/usmca-set-export-u-s-copyright-law-north-american-neighbors/id=118269.
40. Copyright Act, R.S.C. 1985, c C-42 §§ 41.25, 41.26 (Can.). Some countries do not 
require ISPs to take down infringing materials without a court order. See Copyright in Foreign 
Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 5 (statement of Daphne Keller, Professor of Law, Stan-
ford University).
41. The process is explained on a Government of Canada website. See Notice and No-
tice Regime, GOV’T OF CANADA, https://ic.gc.ca/eic/site/oca-bc.nsf/eng/ca02920.html.
42. Id.
43. Id. In December 2018, the Canadian Parliament amended the Copyright Act to clar-
ify that notices of user infringement sent to ISPs should not include a demand for payment or 
an offer to settle a claim of infringement, as this is incompatible with the notice-and-notice 
regime. Id. The U.S. Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study incorrectly stated that Canadian 
notices could ask for license payments. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 52.
44. See, e.g., Michael Geist, USMCA Sends Canada Back to the Drawing Board on 
Copyright Law, CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION (Oct. 3, 2018), 
https://www.cigionline.org/articles/usmca-sends-canada-back-drawing-board-copyright-law.
45. See, e.g., SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 77–83. The Copyright Office has 
one-sidedly accepted anecdotal evidence from copyright industry groups on harms from copy-
right infringement while discounting evidence from ISPs about the scale and repercussions of 
takedown abuses. Compare id. at 78, with id. at 147 (accepting copyright owners’ reliance on 
data from Google’s Transparency Report on the substantial number of takedown requests to 
support the claim that “the system is not working,” but dismissing ISPs’ reliance on an empir-
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has tested the boundaries of the DMCA safe harbors through litigation.
46
While they have not won all of the lawsuits filed, they have achieved nota-
ble successes against peer-to-peer file-sharing firms and providers of torrent 
files who induced copyright infringement.
47
Also notable was a $1 billion 
jury award against Cox Communications for being willfully blind to copy-
right infringement by its users.
48
Failure to adopt or enforce repeat infringer 
policies can result in an ISP losing DMCA safe harbor protections, exposing 
it to copyright liability.
49
Several major copyright industry lawsuits against 
ISPs are pending under secondary liability theories asserting, among other 
things, that the ISPs failed to respond adequately to claims that their users’
activities were infringing.
50
The high costs of defending lawsuits and the po-
tential for gargantuan statutory damage awards has had an additional 
chilling effect on the development and deployment of online platforms.
51
Under pressure from major copyright industry groups, very large plat-
forms such as YouTube and Facebook have developed or licensed automat-
ed content recognition technologies that enable the detection of copyrighted 
files at the time of user uploads. Copyright owners can choose whether to 
ical study from the Lumen database to support ISP claims on the extent of inappropriate no-
tices).
46. See, e.g., Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19 (2d Cir. 2012) (rejecting 
Viacom’s claim that an ISP’s general awareness of infringing user-uploaded content consti-
tutes “red flag” knowledge of infringement); see also SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, 
Part VI (extensively discussing the § 512 case law).
47. See, e.g., Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913 
(2005); in re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643 (7th Cir. 2003); A&M Records, Inc. v. 
Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc. v. Fung, 710 F.3d 
1020 (9th Cir. 2013).
48. See Erik Pedersen, Cox Communications Hit with Billion-Dollar Judgment in Mu-
sic Copyright Suit, DEADLINE (Dec. 19, 2019), https://deadline.com/2019/12/cox-
communications-music-copyright-lawsuit-billion-dollar-judgment-music-labels-1202814269. 
The jury’s damages award was subsequently upheld. Sony Music Entm’t v. Cox Commc’ns, 
Inc., 464 F. Supp. 3d 795 (E.D. Va. 2020).
49. See, e.g., BMG Rights Mgmt. (US) LLC v. Cox Commc’ns, Inc., 881 F.3d 293, 
299, 304–05 (4th Cir. 2018). The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study is highly critical of 
court decisions that, in its view, have given ISPs too much discretion in fashioning repeat in-
fringer policies. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 95–109; infra text accompanying 
note 161–64.
50. See, e.g., J. Alexander Lawrence, Will the Music Industry Continue to Win Its Cop-
yright Battle Against ISPs?, SOCIALLY AWARE (Nov. 7, 2019), https://www.socially
awareblog.com/2019/11/07/will-the-music-industry-continue-to-win-its-copyright-battle-
against-isps.
51. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Copyright and Innovation: The Untold Story, 2012 
WIS. L. REV. 891, 937, 940 (2012). U.S. copyright law allows rights holders to opt for statuto-
ry damages of no less than $750 and up to $30,000 per infringed work, which can be in-
creased to up to $150,000 per infringed work if the infringement is willful. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 504(c).
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allow YouTube to enable these uploads subject to revenue sharing or to 
block infringing uploads.
52
Because many sites that provide access to infringing materials are off-
shore, copyright industry groups strongly supported the Stop Online Piracy 
Act (SOPA) and PROTECT IP Act (PIPA), which would have enabled cop-
yright owners to obtain injunctions requiring U.S.-based ISPs and payment 
processors to block offshore “rogue” websites.
53
After strong public opposi-
tion arose to SOPA and PIPA, these bills failed in Congress.
54
Private initia-
tives with payment processors have alleviated some problems that the copy-
right industries have with these offshore sites.
55
However, copyright 
industry groups believe these and other private initiatives do not go far 
enough. They want new legislation to put more responsibility on ISPs to 
thwart infringements.
52. See, e.g., Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 36, at 512; see also Katherine Oyama, 
Continuing to Create Value While Fighting Piracy: An Update, GOOGLE (July 13, 2016),
https://blog.google/outreach-initiatives/public-policy/continuing-to-create-value-while (re-
porting that more than 90 percent of Content ID claims result in monetization for copyright 
owners).
53. Stop Online Piracy Act, H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011); PROTECT IP Act of 
2011, S. 968, 112th Cong. (2011); see, e.g., Yafit Lev-Aretz, Copyright Lawmaking and Pub-
lic Choice: From Legislative Battles to Private Ordering, 27 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 203, 220–26
(2013) (discussing SOPA and PIPA legislative controversy).
54. Lev-Aretz, supra note 53, at 204–05. Copyright industry representatives have ex-
pressed renewed interest in site-blocking injunctions. See, e.g., Copyright in Foreign Jurisdic-
tions Hearing, supra note 3 (statement of Stan McCoy, President and Managing Director, Mo-
tion Picture Association). The Copyright Office considered, but did not recommend, 
Congressional authorization of site-blocking injunctions. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 
14, at 193–96. Courts have in the past refused to grant injunctive relief against defendants un-
less they have been found to have engaged in copyright infringement. See, e.g., Bryant v. 
Gordon, 503 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1066 (N.D. Ill. 2007); see also Paramount Pictures Corp. v. 
Carol Publ’g Grp., 25 F. Supp. 2d 372, 374, 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1998) (refusing to issue an injunc-
tion against nonparty distributors of copies of infringing books); 4 MELVILLE B. NIMMER &
DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §14.06 [C][2][b] (rev. ed. 2019). Congress may not 
be able to authorize no-fault site-blocking injunctions, for this may be beyond the equitable 
powers of courts. See, e.g., Gen. Bldg. Contractors Ass’n v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 398–
402 (1982) (holding that injunctive relief is not available against an entity that had not violat-
ed the law).
55. Litigation against payment processors as indirect infringers of copyrights failed in 
Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 494 F.3d 788 (9th Cir. 2007). However, negotiations 
between copyright industry groups and payment processors led to the development of best 
practices. See Payment Processor Best Practices for Online Copyright Infringement: What It 
Means for Musicians, FUTURE OF MUSIC COALITION (Oct. 24, 2011), 
https://futureofmusic.org/article/article/payment-processor-best-practices-online-copyright-
infringement.
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II.  Article 17 of the EU’s DSM Directive Is a Deeply Flawed 
Model for Regulating ISPs That Host User-Uploaded Content
An opportunity to press for stronger legislative regulation of ISPs arose 
when the European Union undertook its proposed Directive on Copyright 
and Related Rights in the Digital Single Market.
56
The proposed Directive 
was hugely controversial in the EU, largely because of its Article 13 (now 
Article 17) strict liability rule for certain ISPs that host user-uploaded con-
tent.
57
More than 145 civil society organizations opposed the adoption of the 
precursor to Article 17.
58
More than five million individuals signed a peti-
tion against it.
59
Many European scholars criticized the proposed provision 
because, among other things, this new strict liability regime would under-
mine fundamental freedoms of expression and access to knowledge and cul-
ture.
60
A coalition of 240 EU-based online businesses wrote a letter asking 
members of the EU Parliament to reject this strict liability rule because 
small and medium-sized enterprises would suffer undue financial and opera-
tional burdens if forced to develop or utilize automated content recognition 
tools and because current technologies are too inaccurate.
61
56. See Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9 (providing in Article 13 that “infor-
mation society service providers storing and giving access to large amounts of works and oth-
er subject-matter uploaded by their users” would be strictly liable for user uploads that in-
fringed copyrights).
57. For a range of critical perspectives on the proposed strict liability rule, see Article 
13 Research: Studies, Opinions and Sources of Data, CREATE, https://www.create.ac.uk
/policy-responses/eu-copyright-reform/article-13-research (last visited Mar. 07, 2021). The 
European Commission initially tried to justify this new regulation by claiming it was con-
sistent with existing EU law, which some scholars contested. See, e.g., Bridy, supra note 10, 
at 333–46.
58. See Open Letter to Member of the European Parliament (July 2018), 
https://copybuzz.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/Copyright-Open-Letter-on-EP-Plenary-
Vote-on-Negotiation-Mandate.pdf. Later signatories brought the final total to 167 organiza-
tions opposed to Article 13.
59. See SAVE THE INTERNET, https://www.savetheinternet.info (last visited Mar. 07, 
2021).
60. See, e.g., Christina Angelopoulos, On Online Platforms and the Commission’s New 
Proposal for a Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market (Jan. 2017) (unpublished 
manuscript) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947800) (concluding that the proposed Article 13 of 
the DSM Directive was incompatible with the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, as 
interpreted by the Court of Justice of the EU); see also David Kaye, Mandate of the Special 
Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expres-
sion, 7–8, U.N. Doc. OL OTH 41/2018 (June 13, 2018), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents
/Issues/Opinion/Legislation/OL-OTH-41-2018.pdf (raising specific concerns and concluding 
that he was “very seriously concerned that the proposed Directive would establish a regime of 
active monitoring and prior censorship of user-generated content that is inconsistent with Ar-
ticle 19(3) of the ICCPR.”).
61. E.g., Jos Poortvliet, 240 EU Businesses Sign Open Letter Against Copyright Di-
rective Art. 11 & 13, NEXTCLOUD (Mar. 19, 2019), https://nextcloud.com/blog/130-eu-
businesses-sign-open-letter-against-copyright-directive-art-11-13.
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These criticisms from multiple sectors sufficiently resonated with EU 
policymakers to persuade them to amend the Directive to add numerous 
limitations on the liability rules of what became Article 17 of the DSM Di-
rective.
62
Without the numerous concessions aimed at addressing concerns 
raised by the critics, the DSM Directive would likely have failed in the final 
EU Parliament vote, as it just barely garnered a majority when put to a 
vote.
63
The much-amended DSM Directive became final in April 2019.
64
Member states have until June 2021 to implement the Directive in their na-
tional copyright laws, but only one country has thus far transposed Article 
17 into its national law. Clearly, the controversy over Article 17 is far from 
over.
65
Before discussing the many flaws of DSM Directive Article 17, it is 
important to understand its core norm. Article 17 directs member states of 
the EU to pass legislation with regard to for-profit online content sharing 
services that provide public access to large amounts of user-uploaded con-
tent. EU member states must make these services directly liable for com-
municating to the public any infringing copies uploaded by their users un-
less the services have obtained, or made best efforts to obtain, licenses from 
rights holders. These services must also ensure the unavailability of specific 
works on their sites for which rights holders have provided relevant infor-
mation (such as a digital fingerprint).
66
Under such legislation, online con-
tent sharing services must also act expeditiously to disable access or remove 
62. See Bridy, supra note 10, 351–57 (discussing differences between proposed Article 
13 and the adopted Article 17); see also infra Part II.A.
63. Article 13 (now 17) survived a last-minute bid for its removal by only five votes. 
See James Vincent, Europe’s Controversial Overhaul of Online Copyright Receives Final Ap-
proval, VERGE (Mar. 26, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019/3/26/18280726/europe-
copyright-directive; see also João Pedro Quintais, The New Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market Directive: A Critical Look, 42 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 28 (2020). Some scholars 
have a more positive view of Article 17. See, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, A United States Perspec-
tive on Digital Single Market Directive Art. 17 (Colum. L. Sch. Working Paper, Paper No. 14-
654, 2020), https://scholarship.law.columbia.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=3682&context=
faculty_scholarship.
64. DSM Directive, supra note 11; see SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 61–63
(discussing Article 17). The Copyright Office Study did not discuss the user freedom protec-
tions that Article 17 aims to preserve.
65. See, e.g., Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 6), COMMUNIA (Feb. 
13, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/02/13/article-17-stakeholder-
dialogue-day-6-hitting-brick-wall. Thirteen IP scholars are signatories to the European Copy-
right Society’s recommendations for implementing Article 17 in national laws in a manner 
that provides a pragmatic and balanced approach. Axel Metzger & Martin Senftleben, Com-
ment of the European Copyright Society on Selected Aspects of Implementing Article 17 of the 
Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market into National Law, EUR. COPYRIGHT 
SOC’Y (Apr. 27, 2020), https://europeancopyrightsocietydotorg.files.wordpress.com/2020/04
/ecs-comment-article-17-cdsm.pdf.
66. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(1), (4).
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infringing copies after receiving notice of infringement from rights holders 
and must use best efforts to prevent future uploads.
67
My criticisms of Article 17 are set forth in the remainder of this Part. 
Section A explains that because of several amendments that partially limited 
its scope, Article 17 is more balanced than its precursor in the proposed 
DSM Directive. Section B explains that several of these changes have made 
Article 17 internally inconsistent. Section C discusses ambiguities in Article 
17 that will make it difficult for profit-making ISPs who host user content to 
predict whether they will be subject to Article 17’s strictures or remain 
within the much less strict notice-and-takedown regime that has prevailed 
for the past two decades. Section D suggests that small and medium-sized 
platforms are unlikely to achieve either the licensing or preventive measures 
obligations established by Article 17. Section E considers the Polish gov-
ernment’s challenge to Article 17 under the European Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights as that Charter has been interpreted by the Court of Justice of the 
EU (CJEU).
A. Internal Limits to Article 17 That Respond to Earlier Criticisms
In response to intense criticisms of Article 17’s precursor in the pro-
posed DSM Directive, EU policymakers made several changes that limit the 
scope of Article 17. Without these changes, the DSM Directive would not 
have garnered enough political support to be adopted. Some of these limits 
are more significant than others. It is noteworthy, however, that Article 17 
implicitly retains the E-Commerce Directive’s safe harbors for ISPs that do 
not fall within the DSM definition of online content sharing services. In 
other words, ISPs that do not host “large” amounts of user-uploaded content 
or do not organize and promote user-uploaded content, but merely store 
some such content, along with internet access providers, are exempt from 
the reach of Article 17, although they remain subject to the notice-and-
takedown rules of the E-Commerce Directive.
68
One of the most significant changes to Article 17 is that it does not ap-
ply at all to nonprofit online encyclopedias, educational and scientific repos-
itories, and open source software developing and sharing sites. Also exclud-
ed are providers of electronic communication services, online marketplaces, 
business-to-business cloud services, and cloud services that allow users to 
upload content for their own use.
69
These exclusions recognize that the no-
67. Id. art. 17(4).
68. See id. art. 2(6). The EU is, however, moving ahead with new strict ISP notice-and-
takedown regulations for terrorist content. See, e.g., Colin Lecher, Aggressive New Terrorist 
Content Regulation Passes EU Vote, VERGE (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.theverge.com/2019
/4/17/18412278/eu-terrorist-content-law-parliament-takedown. In addition, the EU is contem-
plating a review and revision of the E-Commerce Directive, which governs ISPs that are out-
side the reach of Article 17. See infra note 106 and accompanying text.
69. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(6).
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tice-and-takedown regime is working well enough to preserve safe harbors 
for these types of online services. It also implicitly recognizes that Article 
17 has the potential to be unduly burdensome for entities that do not pose 
the high risks of infringement that Article 17 was intended to address. The 
strict liability rule in the proposed DSM Directive had no such exclusions. It 
would have applied to all ISPs that enable members of the public to have 
access to “large” amounts of content uploaded by users.
70
Much less significant is the Article 17 provision that lessens the respon-
sibilities of startup online content sharing sites towards rights holders. It ap-
plies to companies that are less than three years old if they have an annual 
turnover below ten million euros. These startup service providers must still 
make “best efforts” to obtain licenses and to disable access or remove in-
fringing content expeditiously after receiving notice.
71
If the average num-
ber of unique monthly visitors exceeds five million, startups will bear an ex-
tra burden of “best efforts” to prevent further uploads of infringing 
materials.
72
This is such a narrow safe harbor that very few, if any, ISPs will 
be able to benefit from it.
Among the most significant limits in Article 17 are a trio of provisions 
aimed at protecting user freedoms. One states that Article 17 “shall in no 
way affect legitimate uses [of copyrighted works], such as uses under ex-
ceptions and limitations” under EU law.
73
A second mandates that coopera-
tion between rights holders and online content sites “shall not result in the 
prevention of the availability of works or other subject matter uploaded by 
users, which do not infringe copyright and related rights, including where 
such works or other subject matter are covered by an exception or limita-
tion.”
74
A third explicitly requires member states to ensure that users can re-
ly on copyright exceptions that enable quotation, criticism, and review as 
well as caricature, parody, or pastiche.
75
These provisions of the DSM Directive implicitly recognize that many 
online content sites host significant quantities of user-generated works, such 
as remixes and mashups, that are lawful as a matter of EU copyright law 
under the quotation or parody exceptions.
76
There was no counterpart to 
70. Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
71. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(6).
72. Id.
73. Id. art. 17(9). See Bridy, supra note 10, at 345–47 (discussing user freedom issues).
74. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(7).
75. Id. But see infra note 129 and accompanying text (French and Dutch proposals for 
implementing Article 17 omit user rights provisions).
76. The adoption of Article 17(7) means that the quotation and parody exceptions are 
now mandatory throughout the EU, even if member states had not previously adopted them. 
See, e.g., João Pedro Quintais et al., Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 
of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations from European 
Academics, 10 (3) JIPITEC 277 ¶ 10-13 (2019), https://www.jipitec.eu/issues/jipitec-10-3-
2019/5042. In keeping with the CJEU’s Deckmyn decision, these exceptions are likely to have 
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these provisions in the initially proposed DSM Directive, which the Com-
mission at the time said would have only a “limited impact” on freedom of 
expression and information.
77
The user freedom–related revisions to Article 
17 reflect the Commission’s acceptance that the new strict liability rules 
pose a much greater risk to fundamental rights than it previously acknowl-
edged.
In addition, Article 17 requires member states to ensure that online con-
tent sharing sites put in place an “effective and expeditious complaint and 
redress mechanism” for users to dispute the removal or disabling of access 
to uploaded contents.
78
This is a further acknowledgement of the risks that 
Article 17 poses for the ability of users to exercise their right to freedom of 
expression under exceptions and limitations. When users do contest 
takedowns, rights holders must justify their assertions that the exceptions or 
limitations do not apply; human review of the disputed content is required.
79
Users are additionally entitled to seek judicial review of their claims.
80
The 
initial version of the DSM Directive made a general statement about the 
need for service providers to provide complaint and redress mechanisms,
81
but Article 17 is much more detailed about what is required.
The DSM Directive also expressly declares that Article 17 does not cre-
ate a general monitoring obligation on online content sharing sites.
82
This is 
in stark contrast to the initially proposed DSM Directive, which explicitly 
called for the use of automated content recognition technologies designed to 
monitor every upload to an ISP’s site to prevent copyright infringement.
83
As finalized, Article 17 has, at least on its face, acknowledged that general 
monitoring of user uploads should not be required.
Article 17’s obligation for online content sharing sites to prevent in-
fringing uploads and reuploads of infringing content applies only as to 
works whose rights holders have provided the sites with “the relevant and 
necessary information” to enable filtering technologies to detect that con-
tent.
84
No similar limitation was contained in the precursor to Article 17.
autonomous (that is, uniform) meanings in all EU member states. See Case C-201/13, 
Deckmyn v. Vandersteen, ECLI:EU:C:2014:2132 (Sept. 3, 2014).
77. Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, Explanatory Memorandum § 3.
78. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(9).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(2).
82. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(8). The European Copyright Society has 
warned that to be consistent with the no-general-monitoring rule of the DSM’s Article 17, the 
E-Commerce Directive’s Article 15, and the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, ISP 
hosting sites should not have to proactively monitor for infringements, and warned against the 
“danger of overblocking” if national implementations adopt extreme views of the “best ef-
forts” provisions of Article 17. Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 5.
83. Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
84. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(4).
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Finally, there is a proportionality limit on the scope of Article 17. In de-
termining whether an online content service is in compliance, legal deci-
sionmakers are supposed to consider (1) the type, audience, and size of the 
service, as well as the types of works uploaded by users to the sites; and (2) 
the availability of “suitable and effective means” for compliance and their 
cost for service providers.
85
Unfortunately, neither the text nor the Recitals 
of the DSM Directive provide guidance about how the proportionality prin-
ciple should be interpreted in relation to service providers. As originally 
proposed, the Directive vaguely mentioned proportionality,
86
although it 
provided even less guidance about the substance of this principle than Arti-
cle 17 now does.
The European Commission hosted six stakeholder dialogues in late 
2019 and early 2020 to get input for its development of best practices guide-
lines for fostering cooperation between online content sharing services and 
rights holders.
87
At the first meeting, one Commissioner expressed the hope 
that now that the Directive was in place, stakeholders would put aside past 
divisions on the issues and work together to make the new paradigm of Ar-
ticle 17 a success.
88
However, no consensus emerged from these stakeholder 
meetings about key issues, such as how to ensure that practicable measures 
are put into place to safeguard user freedoms.
89
After the Commission pub-
lishes its guidelines about Article 17 implementations, it may host addition-
al stakeholder dialogue meetings. Yet, given how deeply divided stakehold-
ers are about Article 17, it is unclear that the Commission will be able to 
issue guidelines that will satisfy all stakeholders.
The Commission has left to EU member states the dilemma of trying to 
transpose Article 17 into their national laws in a manner that meaningfully 
accommodates the limitations on Article 17’s scope and is consistent with 
85. Id. art. 17(5).
86. Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1), (3).
87. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(10). Commentary on the six stakeholder dia-
logues to date and links to materials are available on the Communia website, 
https://www.communia-association.org/?s=stakeholder. Due to the outbreak of the corona-
virus pandemic, a seventh stakeholder dialogue, at which the European Commission was ex-
pected to issue some initial guidance about how to implement Article 17, did not occur. See
Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue: COMMUNIA Input Paper, COMMUNIA (Apr. 2, 
2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/04/02/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-
communia-input-paper. On July 27, 2020, the EC issued a targeted consultation outlining ini-
tial views and requesting written comments from stakeholders by September 10 in order to 
finalize its guidance to member states. See Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Mar-
ket: Commission Seeks the Views of Participants to the Stakeholder Dialogue on Article 17,
EUR. COMM’N (July 27, 2020), https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/directive-
copyright-digital-single-market-commission-seeks-views-participants-stakeholder.
88. Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 1), COMMUNIA (Oct. 23, 2019), 
https://www.communia-association.org/2019/10/23/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-day-1-
old-old.
89. Keller, supra note 65.
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the legislative compromises necessary to get sufficient political support for 
the DSM Directive. Also left to member state legislators is the puzzle of 
how to resolve the inherent contradictions embodied in Article 17, to which 
we now turn.
B. Inherent Contradictions in Article 17
Article 17 contains inherently contradictory provisions on four types of 
rules: those concerning user freedoms, general monitoring, licensing obliga-
tions, and personal data protection. It is difficult to imagine how these con-
tradictions could be resolved through EU member state legislation. It will 
not be surprising if some member states simply transpose the text of Article 
17 into their laws, leaving many practical implementation issues to be nego-
tiated between dominant players in the online services and copyright indus-
tries. Most of the tricky legal interpretation issues will be left to the courts.
1. Automated Content Recognition Technologies Are Inconsistent with 
User Freedoms
The first serious internal contradiction in Article 17 is its implicit re-
quirement that online content sharing sites must adopt automated content 
recognition technologies to prevent infringing uploads and reuploads of in-
fringing contents, while at the same time insisting that Article 17 should not 
interfere with legitimate uses of copyrighted content, such as user creations 
that are covered by copyright exceptions and limitations.
90
Automated content recognition technologies are much more sophisti-
cated today than they were in 1998 or 2000 when the United States and EU 
adopted their notice-and-takedown regimes. What these technologies do 
well, however, is pattern-matching. They cannot take context into account. 
Unfortunately, it is necessary to comprehend the context of a use to deter-
mine whether it is lawful under copyright exceptions.
91
If content recogni-
tion technologies cannot assess context, they will make mistakes and block 
uploads that should have been permitted. It is well-documented that several 
types of common errors result from the use of automated content recogni-
tion technologies, including their inability to detect fair uses.
92
EU policy-
90. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(4), (7).
91. See, e.g., Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue (Day 4), COMMUNIA (Jan. 2, 
2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/01/02/article-17-stakeholder-dialogue-
day-4-transparency; see also DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 6–9
(statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge) (discussing “bad” copyright 
takedown notices due to algorithmic errors).
92. See, e.g., Matthew Sag, Internet Safe Harbors and the Transformation of Copyright 
Law, 93 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 499, 543–54 (2017) (giving numerous examples of automated 
content recognition technology errors); see also Sharon Bar-Ziv & Niva Elkin-Koren, Behind 
the Scenes of Online Copyright Enforcement: Empirical Evidence on Notice & Takedown, 50 
CONN. L. REV. 339, 344, 376 (2018) (discussing examples of automated content recognition 
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makers and legislators have not acknowledged this significant limitation of 
automated content recognition technologies.
During some of the Commission’s stakeholder dialogue meetings, rep-
resentatives of filtering technology firms admitted that their technologies 
cannot understand context. As an Audible Magic representative stated, 
“Copyright exceptions require a high degree of intellectual judgment and an 
understanding and appreciation of context. We do not represent that any 
technology can solve this problem in an automated fashion. Ultimately these 
types of determinations must be handled by human judgment.”
93
Others at 
these dialogue sessions likewise attested that their technologies did not con-
sider context.
94
But, as one participant observed in a blog about these dia-
logues, “as long as filtering technology cannot determine if a use is covered 
by an exception or not then it does not meet the requirements established by 
Article 17 of the Directive.”
95
This contradiction is baked into Article 17. A 
user upload of a parodic video that used a clip from a movie to make fun of 
one of its characters, for instance, would be blocked by automated content 
recognition technologies, even if the parody was lawful under EU law.
Sixty European intellectual property scholars have endorsed a state-
ment, Safeguarding User Freedoms in Implementing Article 17 of the Copy-
right in the Digital Single Market Directive: Recommendations from Euro-
pean Academics, which represents a valiant effort to offer at least a partial 
resolution of this contradiction of Article 17.
96
The statement discusses ways 
to limit the use of preventive measures such as filtering technologies so that 
these measures will not interfere with user rights. It recommends that only 
exact or equivalent copies of the whole or substantial parts of protected 
works should be subject to preventive measures. In addition, it suggests that 
human review should be required to determine if user-generated content 
technology errors); Bridy, supra note 10, at 345–47; Dan L. Burk, Algorithmic Fair Use, 86 
U. CHI. L. REV. 283, 290 (2019) (noting inability of filtering algorithms to assess fair uses); 
Perel & Elkin-Koren, supra note 36, at 478, 506; Michael Andor Brodeur, Copyright Bots and 
Classical Musicians Are Fighting Online. The Bots Are Winning, WASH. POST (May 21, 
2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/entertainment/music/copyright-bots-and-classical-
musicians-are-fighting-online-the-bots-are-winning/2020/05/20/a11e349c-98ae-11ea-89fd-
28fb313d1886_story.html (describing filtering algorithms as incapable of distinguishing dif-
ferent performances of the same piece of classical music).
93. Keller, supra note 91 (ellipsis omitted).




96. Quintais et al., supra note 76. Numerous other commentators have offered recom-
mendations on how the EC can draft its implementing guidelines to mitigate the potential 
harms of Article 17 for user freedoms. See, e.g., Krzysztof Garstka, Guiding the Blind Blood-
hounds: How to Mitigate the Risks Article 17 of Directive 2019/790 Poses to the Freedom of 
Expression, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul L.C. Torremans 
ed., 4th ed. 2020); Keller, supra note 87; Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 9–14.
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such as remixes and mashups are covered by quotation or parody excep-
tions.
97
It remains to be seen whether some of the EU member states will 
follow such recommendations in their implementing legislation.
2. Automated Content Recognition Technologies Are Incompatible with 
the No-General-Monitoring Mandate
A second contradiction built into Article 17 lies in its no-general-
monitoring rule, which is at odds with the requirement that online sharing 
sites make “in accordance with high industry standards of professional dili-
gence, best efforts to ensure the unavailability of specific works and other 
subject matter for which the rightsholders have provided the service provid-
ers with the relevant and necessary information.”
98
By “high industry stand-
ards of professional diligence,” the Commission seems to mean that these 
services must make intensive use of automated content recognition technol-
ogies. These technologies cannot be effective without being general, be-
cause by design they scan every file uploaded onto the service’s site. Thus, 
even though Article 17 no longer expressly requires use of “effective con-
tent recognition technologies,” as its precursor did,
99
it is doubtful that 
online sharing services could satisfy this “best efforts” requirement without 
adopting such technologies. One European commentator has characterized 
the no-general-monitoring provision of Article 17 as a “political state-
ment.”
100
Yet, it makes Article 17 internally inconsistent.
The CJEU recognized the incompatibility of a general filtering technol-
ogy mandate with the E-Commerce Directive’s no-general-monitoring rule 
in its SABAM v. Netlog NV decision.101 SABAM, a Belgian music royalty 
collecting society, sued Netlog, a social media network, for copyright in-
fringement because some of its tens of millions of daily users had used the 
site to exchange recorded music in which SABAM’s members held copy-
rights. As a remedy, SABAM asked for an injunction requiring Netlog to 
install a filtering technology to detect copyright infringements. The CJEU 
97. See Quintais et al., supra note 76, ¶¶ 20, 27. Communia has created a flowchart 
depicting how the Article 17 user rights safeguards could work. Keller, supra note 65.
98. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(4)(b); cf. id. art. 17(8) (no general monitor-
ing obligation).
99. Proposed DSM Directive, supra note 9, art. 13(1).
100. Miquel Peguera, The New Copyright Directive: Online Content-Sharing Service 
Providers Lose eCommerce Directive Immunity and Are Forced to Monitor Content Uploaded 




101. Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85 ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 16, 
2012).
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declared that such an obligation was inconsistent with the E-Commerce Di-
rective’s no-general-monitoring rule.
102
The CJEU has somewhat qualified this standard in the context of a def-
amation claim in Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland.103 The CJEU 
decision approved an Austrian national court’s injunction requiring Face-
book to remove defamatory comments about the plaintiff, an Austrian poli-
tician, and to prevent reuploads of the same or equivalent content.
104
The 
standard established in Glawischnig-Piesczek limits service provider moni-
toring to the specific content that a court has found to be unlawful. The 
CJEU did not provide guidance about how this should be accomplished.
Although Article 17 of the DSM Directive explicitly overrides the safe 
harbor set forth in Article 14 of the E-Commerce Directive as applied to the 
online content sharing sites it will regulate,
105
it says nothing about overrid-
ing the Article 15 no-general-monitoring rule of the E-Commerce Directive. 
Hence, that part of the E-Commerce Directive should still be in force, and 
insofar as Article 17 requires the use of automated content recognition tech-
nologies to process all user uploads, Article 17 conflicts with Article 15 of 
the E-Commerce Directive as well as Article 17(8).
106
102. Id. ¶¶ 33, 52.
103. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 12, 46 (Oct. 3, 2019). For critical commentary on this decision, see, 
e.g., Daphne Keller, Facebook Filters, Fundamental Rights, and the CJEU’s Glawischnig-
Piesczek Ruling, 69 GRUR INT’L 1 (2020).
104. Glawischnig-Piesczek, ECLI:EU:C:2019:458, ¶¶ 37–41. Like Article 17(8) of the 
DSM Directive and Article 15 of the E-Commerce Directive, § 512(m) of the DMCA pro-
vides that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor their sites for infringing materials. 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512(m)(1). The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study asserted that § 512(m) notwithstand-
ing, ISPs should engage in more monitoring when they have reason to believe infringing ma-
terials exist on their sites. It urged Congress to revisit § 512(c) and (d) ISP-knowledge-of-
infringement requirements, as well as the willful blindness doctrine, to incentivize ISPs to do 
more to thwart infringements on their sites. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 3–4, 
123, 127.
105. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(3).
106. The European Commission has, however, begun a consultation concerning the Dig-
ital Services Act, which contemplates a review and revision of the E-Commerce Directive, 
including its intermediary liability rules. See, e.g., Natasha Lomas, Europe Asks for Views on 
Platform Governance and Competition Tools, TECHCRUNCH (June 2, 2020), 
https://techcrunch.com/2020/06/02/europe-asks-for-views-on-platform-governance-and-
competition-tools. On December 15, 2020, the EC issued first drafts of the Digital Services 
Act along with the Digital Markets Act. See Proposal for a Regulation of the European Par-
liament and of the Council on a Single Market for Digital Services (Digital Services Act) and 
amending Directive 2000/31/EC, COM (2020) 825 final (Dec. 15, 2020); Proposal for a Reg-
ulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Contestable and Fair Markets in 
the Digital Sector (Digital Markets Act), COM (2020) 842 final (Dec. 15, 2020).
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3. The Licensing Objectives of Article 17 Cannot Be Achieved
A third contradiction arises from Article 17’s unrealistic requirement 
that online sharing sites make “best efforts” to get authorization for user-
uploaded content through licensing. As acknowledged in the Directive’s
preamble, the market for online content is complex and involves “a large 
amount” of content.
107
Indeed, there are literally billions of in-copyright 
works of all kinds on the internet and billions of creators who own rights in 
those works. It is simply impossible for online sharing sites to get authoriza-
tion from all of the creators of these works. How could such services plausi-
bly satisfy a “best efforts” requirement for these billions of works and their 
creators?
108
Photographs are one type of copyrighted work that people share widely 
through social media. It is not realistically possible for the operator of a so-
cial media site to identify and make sure to have a license for every photo-
graph that its users share. Given how ubiquitous user-authored digital pho-
tographs are, which no established collecting societies could license, it is 
virtually impossible for the service to identify each photograph’s copyright 
owner and get a license for each one. For a service to take a license from a 
collecting society that represents professional photographers when it hosts 
user-authored photographs would mean paying them for works their mem-
bers did not create. There is, moreover, no standard content recognition 
identification system (such as fingerprinting) for photographs to enable a 
service to detect infringing photographs.
The Commission has failed to recognize the impossibility of obtaining 
licenses from all creators or to give guidance about what types of licenses a 
site would have to try to secure. It also failed to consider the complexities of 
the licensing market and the various business models and selective licensing 
preferences of different copyright owners. Even though an important goal of 
the DSM Directive is to support the existence of a “digital single market”
for EU content, there is, in fact, no one-stop-shop at which one can get EU-
wide licenses.
107. DSM Directive, supra note 11, recital 62.
108. See, e.g., Husovec, supra note 13, at 72 (“It is clear that obtaining such consent 
[from all rights holders] is practically impossible, as transaction costs would be prohibitively 
high.”); see also Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 5–6 (suggesting guidelines for im-
plementing the licensing norm). Variations in translations of the DSM Directive will give rise 
to disagreements about the “best efforts” requirement. See Eleonora Rosati, DSM Directive 
Series #5: Does the DSM Directive Mean the Same Thing in All Language Versions? 
The Case of “Best Efforts” in Article 17(4)(a), IPKAT (May 22, 2019), 
http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2019/05/dsm-directive-series-5-does-dsm.html (explaining that 
some countries have translated “best” as “greater,” “greatest,” or “all” in their respective lan-
guages).
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4. Automated Content Recognition Technologies Require Processing of 
Personal Data, Notwithstanding Article 17’s Assurance That User 
Privacy Would Be Unaffected
A fourth contradiction embedded in Article 17 concerns personal data. 
Article 17 states that it “shall not lead to any identification of individual us-
ers nor to the processing of personal data” except in accordance with EU 
law.
109
However, as the CJEU recognized in Netlog, automated content 
recognition technologies are designed to monitor all user-uploaded content 
on ISP hosting sites. This “involve[s] the identification, systematic analysis 
and processing of information connected with [user] profiles . . . [which] is 
protected personal data because, in principle, it allows those users to be 
identified.”
110
Interference with users’ personal data rights was one of the 
bases on which the CJEU denied SABAM’s requested filtering injunction in 
Netlog.111 The Commission has yet to explain its theory that Article 17 is 
compatible with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), the EU’s
framework for digital privacy laws.
112
C. Ambiguities in Article 17
The most significant and consequential ambiguity in Article 17 is its 
vague definition of the online content sharing services that will be subject to 
its strict rules. Recital 62 of the Directive says that the definition “should 
target only online services that play an important role on the online content 
market by competing with other online content services, such as online au-
dio and video streaming services for the same audiences.”
113
However, Re-
citals do not have the force of law in the EU, and the Directive’s actual def-
inition is much fuzzier:
“online content-sharing service provider” means a provider of an 
information society service of which the main or one of the main 
purposes is to store and give the public access to a large amount of 
copyright-protected works or other protected subject matter up-
109. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(9).
110. C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶ 49 (Feb. 16, 2012).
111. Id. ¶ 51; see also Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-
11959, ¶ 53 (holding that an injunction to install filtering system would infringe users’ rights 
to protection of personal data and freedom of expression under the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights); Felipe Romero Moreno, ‘Upload Filters’ and Human Rights: Implementing Arti-
cle 17 of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single Market, 34 INT’L REV. L. COMPUTS.
& TECH. 153, 162 (2020) (arguing that deep packet inspection of upload filters would invade 
user privacy, personal data, and confidential communications).
112. See, e.g., Moreno, supra note 111, at 164–65 (discussing how Article 17 might run 
afoul of GDPR’s requirements). The Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study reports that copy-
right owners are frustrated by the GDPR, as it makes the task of identifying infringers more 
difficult. See SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 34.
113. DSM Directive, supra note 11, recital 62.
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loaded by its users, which it organises and promotes for profit-
making purposes.
114
This definition would seem to encompass ISPs that host UGC content 
that is overwhelmingly created by the users who uploaded their works to the 
ISP’s site (e.g., TikTok). The DSM Directive states that decisions about 
whether an ISP falls within the online content sharing service definition 
should be made on a case-by-case basis.
115
ISPs that enable some content-
sharing are at risk if they cannot reasonably predict whether they will be 
subject to Article 17’s burdens. It is also unclear what “large” means in this 
context.
116
With such vague terminology at the outset, it will be difficult for many 
U.S. companies to know whether the Article 17 mandates apply to them. 
Does the DSM Directive’s definition of an online content sharing service 
include, for example, dating services such as Tinder, image-sharing services 
such as Imgur, commentary sites such as Reddit, news sites that allow user 
comments such as TechDirt, knitting share sites such as Ravelry, real estate 
sites such as Zillow, website hosts such as WordPress, personal profile and 
influencer blog sites such as Tumblr, or other new types of ISP yet to 
emerge in the digital economy? A photography site, for example, might host 
a large quantity of works whose copyrights are owned by the users who post 
them, yet also host a small but non-trivial portion of works that are not. 
Such legal uncertainty and attendant financial burdens are undesirable.
Also unclear is what actions online sharing sites must do to satisfy the 
“best efforts” obligation to get licenses from rights holders.
117
Collecting so-
cieties in the EU, as well as large EU-based rights holders, may be eager to 
grant licenses to online content sharing services. Article 17 certainly pro-
vides them with leverage so that licenses are granted on their preferred 
terms. However, during the stakeholder dialogue meetings, some rights 
holders have made clear that they do not want to grant licenses. Movie stu-
dios, for example, are far more concerned with blocking any form of distri-
114. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(6) (emphasis added). National implementa-
tions of the DSM Directive could refine the definition of “online content-sharing service pro-
vider” to make that term less ambiguous. See Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 2–3.
115. DSM Directive, supra note 11, recital 63.
116. See, e.g., Sophie Stalla-Bourdillon et al., A Brief Exegesis of the Proposed Copy-
right Directive 4 (Nov. 24, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (https://ssrn.com
/abstract=2875296).
117. See João Pedro Quintais & Martin Husovec, How to License Article 17 of the Copy-
right in the Digital Single Market Directive? Exploring the Implementation Options for the 
New EU Rules on Content-Sharing Platforms, 70 GRUR INT’L (forthcoming 2021); see also
Matthias Leistner, European Copyright Licensing and Infringement Liability Under Art. 17 
DSM-Directive, 2020 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GEISTIGES EIGENTUM/INTELL. PROP. J. 123 (discuss-
ing the need for collective blanket licenses for many categories of works and uses).
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bution or performance of their works, compared to their music industry 
counterparts who enthusiastically seek licensing deals.
118
Moreover, it will be exceedingly expensive to negotiate licenses with 
even the most obvious EU-based licensors because in virtually every mem-
ber state of the EU there are specialized collecting societies that represent 
different types of rights holders (e.g., composers, photographers, text au-
thors). Each of these collecting societies (except in certain Nordic countries) 
represents only those rights holders who are members, not other creators 
who have chosen not to join the society. Furthermore, Article 17 applies to 
all types of copyrighted works, some of which may not be represented by 
collecting societies. Civil society groups have suggested the use of compul-
sory or statutory licenses to ease the burden on online sharing sites and ben-
efit users, but major content industry groups have been unreceptive to these 
suggestions.
119
The proportionality standard of Article 17(5) is similarly vague about 
how it would affect an online content sharing service’s licensing and in-
fringement prevention obligations under Article 17(4). Article 17(5) directs 
consideration of the size and type of the service, the type of content it 
serves, and its audience, as well as the availability of relevant means and 
costs to the service provider. Yet there is no guidance about how these fac-
tors are to be weighed and how this would affect obligations. An ISP that 
arguably falls within the DSM definition of online content sharing sites 
cannot reasonably determine its compliance obligations given the vagueness 
of this standard. Obviously, YouTube would be held to a high standard, but 
it has already deployed Content ID, which some copyright owners neverthe-
less complain does not block enough content.
120
Neither the text of Article 
17 nor the DSM preamble provides meaningful guidance about how this 
standard would be assessed.
The so-called startup exception set forth in Article 17(6), moreover, is 
woefully narrow. It offers very little protection to these nascent businesses. 
If in the second year of a startup’s operation, for example, some user up-
loads go viral, causing monthly visitors to exceed five million, then this lim-
itation on the service provider’s liability would no longer apply,
121
even if 
the viral content was perfectly legal. An eligible service would, moreover, 
lose this limitation on liability at the start of its third year, even though it 
might remain as small in that third year as in the first two years of its opera-
tions. Investors will be reluctant to provide seed funding if the very high ex-
118. Paul Keller, Article 17 Stakeholder Dialogue: What Have We Learned So Far,
COMMUNIA (Jan. 16, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/01/16/article-17-
stakeholder-dialogue-learned-far.
119. See, e.g., Keller, supra note 88.
120. See, e.g., SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 44.
121. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(6).
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penses of filtering and licensing will automatically kick in before the startup 
has a chance to prove its worth in the marketplace.
D.  Article 17 Will Harm Small and Medium-Sized ISPs
Recall that prior to the final vote on the Directive, 240 EU-based online 
service providers explained in a letter to the European Parliament that small 
and medium-sized enterprises cannot afford to develop or deploy automated 
content recognition technologies and take on other related expenses.
122
These technologies are expensive to develop and operate, as new reference 
files about digital content must be constantly added and system upgrades 
will be an ongoing necessity. Service providers may end up locked-in to a 
particular technology provider, even if the technology turns out to be 
flawed.
The “best efforts” licensing burden of Article 17 will also put small and 
medium-sized firms at a significant disadvantage, especially if they have to 
negotiate with numerous collecting societies on a member-state-by-
member-state basis. Moreover, the startup limitation on Article 17 is so nar-
row, it cannot overcome the obstacles that Article 17 poses for these firms. 
One would hope that EU competition authorities might be able to help to 
mitigate these problems, but those authorities did not weigh in on the com-
petitive impacts of the DSM Directive as the Directive was being finalized.
Google has reportedly spent about $100 million to develop Content 
ID,
123
but it does not license that technology to other ISPs. Because its de-
velopment of this technology gives Google a competitive edge, it is unlikely 
that this policy will change. Other firms, including Audible Magic, do li-
cense their automated content recognition technologies,
124
but Article 17-
like mandates may cause prices for these licenses to skyrocket beyond what 
would prevail if firms were free to choose whether to take such licenses. Ar-
ticle 17 may have created incentives for developing new automated content 
recognition technologies,
125
but it remains to be seen whether existing or fu-
ture technologies will satisfy the vague “best efforts” requirement or wheth-
er the emergence of competitive filtering systems will be impeded by pa-
122. See Bridy, supra note 10, at 349–50; Poortvliet, supra note 61. But see Metzger & 
Senftleben, supra note 65, at 6–8 (suggesting some accommodations for small and medium-
sized online content sharing services).
123. See Bridy, supra note 10, at 350.
124. See id. at 341.
125. Martin Husovec has questioned this incentives story and persuasively argued that 
“demand for [filtering] technologies is actually likely to shrink under [notice-and-staydown] 
compared to [notice-and-takedown], where both intermediaries and right holders are interest-
ed in the services.” Husovec, supra note 13, at 76. Mandating use of filtering technologies 
would likely, he argues, cause fewer ISPs to enter or remain in the market. Larger ISPs are 
more likely to build their own technologies to gain a competitive advantage over other ISPs, 
so they too may be less likely to license independent filtering systems. Id. at 75–76.
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tents. Competition authorities should monitor the impact of Article 17 on 
entry into online services markets.
EU policymakers also appear to have misapprehended the formidable 
technical challenges of developing a massive filtering system, such as diffi-
culties in acquiring the necessary reference files of digital content necessary 
for an automated content recognition engine to do pattern-matching.
126
While Content ID and Audible Magic have large databases of reference 
files, these files overwhelmingly identify sound recordings and motion pic-
tures. However, Article 17 does not restrict its implicit filtering mandate to 
only these types of copyrighted content. Many online content sharing ser-
vices that would arguably be subject to Article 17 host other types of con-
tents, such as fan fiction stories, photographs, and mixed media works, for 
which automated content recognition technologies, as well as entities capa-
ble of licensing rights in these types of content, are unavailable.
E. Article 17 May Violate the European Charter of Fundamental Rights
In December 2020, Netherlands became the first member state to trans-
pose Article 17 into its national copyright law, while France adopted a law 
authorizing implementation by decree.
127
In addition, as this Article is going 
to press, Germany, Austria, and Finland are considering proposals for im-
plementing this complex regulation.
128
France and the Netherlands appear to 
have taken different approaches in their respective transpositions, but nei-
ther meaningfully addresses the preservation of user rights, the no-general-
126. See Bridy, supra note 10, at 351; see also Husovec, supra note 13, at 74 (“Collect-
ing and verifying meta-data constitutes large transaction costs, so their lack could easily im-
pede use of [filtering] tools.”).
127. Paul Keller, Divergence Instead of Guidance: The Article 17 Implementation Dis-
cussion in 2020—Part 2, KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (Jan. 22, 2021), 
http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2021/01/22/divergence-instead-of-guidance-the-article-
17-implementation-discussion-in-2020-part-2.
128. See id.; Paul Keller, DSM Directive Implementation Update: More Proposals to 
Protect Users’ Rights, COMMUNIA (Jan. 7, 2021), https://www.communia-association.org
/2021/01/07/dsm-directive-implementation-update-more-proposals-to-protect-users-rights. 
Denmark has announced that it will not conclude its implementation process until after the 
June deadline. Id. CREATe is maintaining a webpage tracking each member state’s imple-
mentation process. See Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive – Implementation,
CREATE, https://www.create.ac.uk/cdsm-implementation-resource-page/#consultations-
transpositions. According to the CREATe site, Croatia and Hungary appear to have published 
draft legislation, but with little or no English-language commentary. Id. The European Copy-
right Society has asserted that most terms of Article 17 are subject to the CJEU’s review as 
autonomous interpretations of the Directive. Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65, at 9. This 
may mean that national deviations from key terms may be struck down by the CJEU. The 
United Kingdom, which is no longer a member of the EU, announced that it would not im-
plement the DSM Directive. See Copyright: EU Action, Written Question 4371, UK
PARLIAMENT, https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/Commons/2020-01-16/4371.
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monitoring, or personal data rights issues raised above.
129
The draft imple-
mentation proposals of Germany, Austria, and Finland, on the other hand, 
attempt to balance the interests of rights holders and users along with 
providing some clarity to content sharing services, though they are not en-
tirely free of blemishes.
130
Because there has been little actual implementa-
tion of Article 17, it is premature to assess whether member states will be 
able to resolve its internal contradictions. Additionally, we cannot know 
whether Article 17 implementations will achieve the Directive’s objectives
of getting substantial revenues to EU rights holders, lessening the amount of 
online infringement on content sharing sites, and harmonizing the laws of 
EU member states to create a digital single market.
131
The government of Poland has mounted a challenge to the legality of 
Article 17 before the CJEU. It has asked that court to annul Article 17(4)(b) 
and 17(4)(c) or, in the alternative, to annul Article 17 entirely.
132
Poland 
contends that Article 17 makes it necessary for content sharing services to 
employ upload filters as “preventive control mechanisms,” which is incom-
patible with the right to freedom of expression and information guaranteed 
by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
133
Whether the CJEU will 
129. Paul Keller, Article 17: Both French and Dutch Implementation Proposals Lack 
Key User Rights Safeguards, COMMUNIA (Jan. 10, 2020), https://www.communia-
association.org/2020/01/10/article-17-implementation-french-dutch-implementation-
proposals-lack-key-user-rights-safeguards.
130. See, e.g., Paul Keller, Austrian Article 17 Proposal: The High Road Towards Im-
plementation?, COMMUNIA (Dec. 14, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/12
/14/austrian-article-17-proposal-high-road-towards-implementation; Paul Keller, Finnish Arti-
cle 17 Implementation Proposal Prohibits the Use of Automated Upload Filters, COMMUNIA
(Dec. 23, 2020), https://www.communia-association.org/2020/12/23/finnish-article-17-
implementation-proposal-prohibits-the-use-of-automated-upload-filters; Julia Reda, In Copy-
right Reform, Germany Wants to Avoid Over-Blocking, Not Rule Out Upload Filters—Part 1,
KLUWER COPYRIGHT BLOG (July 9, 2020), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/07/09
/in-copyright-reform-germany-wants-to-avoid-over-blocking-not-rule-out-upload-filters-part-
1/?doing_wp_cron=1594746228.0162110328674316406250.
131. See also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 8 (statement 
of Julia Reda, Former Member of the European Parliament & Fellow, Berkman Klein Center 
for Internet & Society, Harvard University) (“The adoption of the DSM Directive has plunged 
online businesses into legal uncertainty that is likely to stretch for years, if not decades.”).
132. Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland v. European Parliament and Council of the Eu-
ropean Union (May 29, 2019). On November 10, 2020, the CJEU heard arguments in this 
case, which reportedly revealed inherent conflicts within Article 17. A ruling is expected in 
summer of 2021. See, e.g., Paul Keller, CJEU Hearing in the Polish Challenge to Article 17: 
Not Even the Supporters of the Provision Agree on How It Should Work, KLUWER 
COPYRIGHT BLOG (Nov. 11, 2020), http://copyrightblog.kluweriplaw.com/2020/11/11/cjeu-
hearing-in-the-polish-challenge-to-article-17-not-even-the-supporters-of-the-provision-agree-
on-how-it-should-work.
133. Case C-401/19, Republic of Poland; see, e.g., Christophe Geiger et al., Intermedi-
ary Liability and Fundamental Rights, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK ON INTERMEDIARY 
LIABILITY ONLINE 139, 140–46 (Giancarlo Frosio ed., 2020), https://ssrn.com
/abstract=3411633 (discussing fundamental freedoms and concerns about Article 17 under-
mining them); JULIA REDA ET AL., GESELLSCHAFT FÜR FREIHEITSRECHTE E.V., ARTICLE 17
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rule Article 17 unconstitutional on its face remains to be seen. This is, how-
ever, far from a frivolous complaint given the CJEU’s Netlog decision,134
among others.
135
Recall that SABAM was denied, on fundamental rights 
grounds, to get an injunction that would require Netlog to install filters to 
prevent the availability of infringing music on its network.
136
The recent Glawischnig-Piesczek decision might suggest that the CJEU 
has become more tolerant of injunctions that impose monitoring obligations, 
although the injunction in that case focused on blocking access to a specific 
instance of online content that had been adjudicated to be unlawful.
137
It is 
important to note that this CJEU opinion did not analyze the impact of such 
a monitoring injunction on fundamental rights, as the CJEU’s Netlog deci-
sion did.
138
The CJEU in Netlog ruled that the injunction SABAM sought that 
would impose a general monitoring obligation on that ISP would violate Ar-
ticle 15 of the E-Commerce Directive and fundamental freedoms under the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights.
139
Such an injunction would not 
respect a fair balance between the interests of copyright owners, on the one 
hand, and the freedom to conduct one’s business on the other. In addition, 
the “contested filtering system may also infringe the fundamental rights of 
that hosting service provider’s service users, namely, their right to protec-
tion of their personal data and their freedom to receive or impart infor-
mation.”
140
The CJEU also observed that filtering technologies cannot dis-
tinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of contents and so could block 
lawful communications under copyright exceptions.
141
Leading scholars in 
OF THE DIRECTIVE ON COPYRIGHT IN THE DIGITAL SINGLE MARKET: A FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS ASSESSMENT (2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3732223 (assessing Article 17 and 
concluding that it fails to balance the fundamental rights affected).
134. Case C-360/10, SABAM v. Netlog NV, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 33–34 (Feb. 16, 
2012); see supra notes 101–02 and accompanying text (discussing Netlog); see also Bridy, 
supra note 10, at 344–46 (discussing the CJEU’s Netlog decision).
135. See, e.g., Case C-70/10, Scarlet Extended SA v. SABAM, 2011 E.C.R. I-11959, ¶ 
53 (holding that an injunction to require peer-to-peer filesharing service to install filtering sys-
tem would violate EU Directives and fundamental rights under the EU Charter of Fundamen-
tal Rights); see also Bridy, supra note 10, at 343–44, 346 (discussing Scarlet Extended).
136. Netlog, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 39–52.
137. Case C-18/18, Glawischnig-Piesczek v. Facebook Ireland Ltd., 
ECLI:EU:C:2019:458458, ¶ 53 (Oct. 3, 2019).
138. Id.; see also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 7–9
(statement of Daphne Keller, Professor of Law, Stanford University) (noting that the “filtering 
requirement like the one imposed in Facebook’s Austrian case would be unconstitutional in 
the U.S.”).
139. Netlog, ECLI:EU:C:2012:85, ¶¶ 38, 46–50.
140. Id. ¶ 48.
141. Id. ¶ 50.
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the EU have criticized the DSM’s upload filter requirement for ISPs on sim-
ilar fundamental freedom grounds.
142
Yet, even if Article 17 survives Poland’s challenge, national implemen-
tations and judicial interpretations of its provisions in particular cases will 
still be subject to judicial review. Several commentators have, therefore, fo-
cused on recommendations to ensure maximal compliance with user rights 
and freedoms.
143
Fundamental freedoms could be preserved insofar as Article 17 would 
allow online content services to avoid having to adopt automated content 
recognition technologies if they obtain licenses to cover user uploads of 
copyrighted content. This may be somewhat feasible in the EU because 
many collecting societies have the capacity to grant licenses to a wide varie-
ty of works on behalf of large numbers of specific categories of creators.
144
The United States, by contrast, has almost no well-established and well-
functioning collecting societies—except as to music—akin to those preva-
lent in the EU that could enable licensing of millions of copyrighted 
works.
145
Because of this, licensing is not a viable alternative for U.S.-based 
content sharing platforms to avoid having to adopt automated content 
recognition technologies under the EU Directive or under any U.S. adoption 
of an Article 17-like regime. This is yet another reason why Congress 
should not look to Article 17 as a model in any reconsideration of the 
§ 512(c) DMCA safe harbor.
The EU has a very different and much more paternalistic regulatory le-
gal culture than the United States.
146
With the adoption of Article 17, the EU 
has created a complex new regulatory framework that will make it very dif-
ficult, and perhaps impossible, for most UGC platforms to continue to oper-
ate and offer culturally diverse contents to EU residents. There is a reason 
why U.S.-based internet platforms have been so much more successful than 
EU-based firms: the U.S. legal culture is less paternalistic and more hospi-
142. See, e.g., Angelopoulos, supra note 60; Garstka, supra note 96; Geiger et al., supra
note 133; Moreno, supra note 111. A very recent assessment concludes that Article 17 is in-
compatible with fundamental rights. Christophe Geiger & Bernd Justin Jütte, Platform Liabil-
ity Under Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive, Automated Fil-
tering and Fundamental Rights: An Impossible Match, 70 GRUR INT’L (forthcoming 2021).
143. See DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(10) (directing the EC to hold stakeholder 
dialogues to discuss best practices and that special account be taken “of the need to balance 
fundamental rights and of the use of exceptions and limitations.”); see, e.g., Quintais et al., 
supra note 76; Metzger & Senftleben, supra note 65; Moreno, supra note 111.
144. See, e.g., COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT OF COPYRIGHT AND RELATED RIGHTS ch. 
4–8 (Daniel Gervais ed., 3d ed. 2015) (discussing collective management in the EU and spe-
cific countries and sectors of Europe); Quintais & Husovec, supra note 117 (discussing licens-
ing options).
145. See COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT, supra note 144, ch. 11.
146. See, e.g., Pamela Samuelson, Regulating Technology Through Copyright Law: A 
Comparative Perspective, 42 EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 214 (2020) (discussing differences in 
the copyright and legal cultures of the United States and the EU).
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table to entrepreneurship and innovation. For the many reasons set forth in 
this Part, Article 17 should not serve as a model for any reconsideration of 
ISP safe harbors by the U.S. Congress.
III.  Congress Should Take a Balanced Approach in Regulating 
ISPs That Host User-Uploaded Content
Insofar as the U.S. Congress reconsiders the DMCA safe harbors, it 
should strive for a balanced approach. As important as are the interests of 
the copyright industries and professional authors and artists who support 
stronger copyright rules, there are other important industry, individual crea-
tor, and public interests at stake in the regulations that affect online content 
hosting services. Many of these stakeholders would be adversely affected by 
U.S. adoption of Article 17-like rules or by changes to the DMCA safe har-
bors recommended in the Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study.
A. The U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study Does Not Fairly 
Balance Stakeholder Interests
To prepare for its Section 512 Study, the Copyright Office solicited 
comments from stakeholders and hosted a series of roundtables about how 
the DMCA safe harbors have been working over the past two decades.
147
After nearly five years of work, the Office concluded that the DMCA no-
tice-and-takedown regime is “unbalanced” and needs some “fine-
tun[ing].”
148
Unfortunately, the Study itself is imbalanced, premised, as it is, 
on an oversimplistic duality: even if ISPs think § 512 is working reasonably 
well, copyright industries do not, and “the fact that one of the two principal 
groups whose interests Congress sought to balance is virtually uniform in its 
dissatisfaction with the current system suggests that at least some of the 
statute’s objectives are not being met.”
149
The Study gave essentially no at-
tention to the interests of the hundreds of millions of internet users and the 
many millions of user-creators who rely on content-sharing platforms to 
reach audiences,
150
even though copyright law is supposed to promote the 
public interest, not just the interests of major copyright industry groups.
147. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 1. The Office received more than 92,000 
written comments in response to its call for comments. Id. at 12–13.
148. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 72, 198.
149. Id. at 83. Perusing the public comments submitted to the Copyright Office for its 
512 Study, https://copyright.gov/policy/section512/, it is worth noting that none of the major 
software or videogame companies, which are significant players in the copyright industries, 
took positions against the DMCA safe harbors. Nor were broadcast and cable companies on 
record as opposed to these rules.
150. See DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 3–5 (statement of 
Abigail Rives, IP Counsel, Engine); DMCA’s Notice-and Takedown Hearing, supra, 4–5
(statement of Jonathan Berroya, then-Interim President and CEO, Internet Association).
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The Study criticized the courts for construing too broadly the types of 
services that Congress intended to qualify for the § 512 safe harbors, partic-
ularly § 512(c) for hosting user contents, on the theory that certain unfore-
seen activities were “related” to storage on behalf of users.
151
The Study 
suggested that Congress intended for the § 512(c) safe harbor to apply only 
to services that passively store information on behalf of users. Under this 
interpretation, Wikipedia would probably qualify for this safe harbor, but 
virtually every other ISP that hosts user-uploaded contents would not. As 
one witness at a Senate IP Subcommittee hearing observed in written testi-
mony, to restrict the safe harbors to the types of hosting services common in 
1998 “would all but exclude every modern OSP from the scope of section 
512(c), giving liability protections only to the bulletin board services from 
the 1990s.”
152
This witness pointed out that the Study ignored that “the 
DMCA was intended to incentivize innovation and the growth of the inter-
net” and that “algorithmic recommendations—which benefit users by con-
necting them to their communities and information they are likely to be in-
terested in—do not negate the principle that the underlying content is stored 
at the direction of the user.”
153
The Study was also highly critical of judicial decisions concerning what 
constitutes actual knowledge of infringement on an ISP’s site, “red flag”
knowledge, willful blindness to infringement, and, by extension, judicial in-
terpretations of § 512(m), which provides that ISPs have no duty to monitor 
for infringement.
154
The Study faulted decisions that it thought had conflated 
the actual and “red flag” (that is, where facts and circumstances make in-
fringing activity on the site apparent) knowledge standards, which in its es-
timation created an excessively narrow space in which to define an ISP’s
obligation.
155
The Study asserted that an ISP has “red flag” knowledge if it 
has a more general knowledge of infringing materials on its site.
156
Moreo-
ver, if an ISP received repeat takedown notices about one of its users, the 
Study would treat this as “red flag” knowledge.
157
151. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 84–95. For instance, it criticized the Second 
Circuit’s ruling in Viacom Int’l, Inc. v. YouTube, Inc., 676 F.3d 19, 38-39 (2d Cir. 2012), that 
YouTube was eligible for the § 512(c) safe harbor insofar as it transcoded uploaded videos, 
enabled other users to view them, and provided automated recommendations because these 
activities were sufficiently related to hosting user contents.
152. Id.; see DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 7 (statement of 
Jonathan Berroya, then-Interim President and CEO, Internet Association) (adding “[s]imply 
because the internet experience in 1998 was not as rich as it is now does not mean that today’s
OSPs should be excluded from the safe harbor.”)
153. DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16 (statement of Jonathan 
Berroya, then-Interim President and CEO, Internet Association).
154. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 111–28.
155. Id. at 113–24.
156. Id. at 111–12 n.591.
157. Id. at 114.
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Although § 512(m) provides that ISPs do not have a duty to monitor 
their sites for infringing materials, the Study concluded that ISPs should 
monitor their sites and have a duty to investigate further if its staff comes 
across material that may be infringing.
158
Failure to do so, it suggests, may 
justify a finding of willful blindness to infringement.
159
The Study suggested 
that larger ISPs that host user-uploaded audiovisual works “with a history of 
hosting infringing content may need to implement costly filtering technolo-
gies,” even if smaller sites “might just need to assign content review to an 
existing employee.”
160
The Study concluded that courts have also given ISPs too much leeway 
in formulating and carrying out repeat infringer policies.
161
ISPs should, it 
suggests, be required to publicly disclose the terms on which they will ter-
minate users charged with infringement.
162
Many ISPs do not inform their 
users about the circumstances under which their accounts will be terminat-
ed. The Study asserted that users need to know what the ISP’s policy is and 
what will happen if they violate it.
163
Moreover, it equates an ISP’s receipt 
of facially compliant takedown notices for particular users as evidence that 
the users actually are infringers, evidence that should count toward termina-
tion of the users’ accounts.
164
This is analogous to thinking that filing a 
complaint in federal court is the same thing as getting a judgment on the 
merits.
The Study faulted ISPs for choosing not to remove or disable content 
after receiving a takedown notice in circumstances where the ISPs believe 
158. Id. at 122–124.
159. Id. at 126–27.
160. Id. at 123–24.
161. Id. at 95–110.
162. Id. at 106. Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel of Public Knowledge, raised concerns in 
her Senate testimony about termination of Internet access as a penalty for repeat infringement 
as applied to customers of broadband services because the Internet has become an essential 
communications service in the modern era. (This has been abundantly clear during the coro-
navirus pandemic.) Many households depend on Internet access for its members to be able to 
work remotely, attend classes, access medical care, get news, and communicate with others. 
Misdeeds by one member of a household should not result in everyone in that household be-
ing completely cut off from the world. DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 
16, at 15–18 (statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge). This is partic-
ularly true for the more than 100 million households that have access to only one broadband 
provider. Id.; see also Geiger et al., supra note 133, at 4–8 (arguing that Internet access has 
been evolving as a fundamental human right). The Study did at least recognize that a “differ-
ent approach” should be taken toward university students because cutting off their Internet 
access would be “tantamount to expelling them from the university.” SECTION 512 STUDY, 
supra note 14, at 109–10 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also DMCA’s Notice-and-
Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 6 (statement of David Hansen, Lead Copyright & In-
formation Policy Officer, Duke University) (“I cannot overstate how critical network access 
has become for modern teaching and learning . . . .”).
163. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 106.
164. Id. at 98–103.
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that the challenged use is fair or otherwise non-infringing. In the Office’s
view, this fails to honor the statutory requirement that ISPs act expeditiously 
to remove or disable access after getting facially compliant takedown notic-
es.
165
The Study failed to acknowledge that it is risky for an ISP to decide 
not to remove challenged content, as the safe harbor would no longer apply 
if its judgment about fair use was wrong. The Study also asserted that copy-
right owners should not have to consider whether someone’s use of their 
content was fair use before sending takedown notices to ISPs, a conclusion 
that directly contradicts a well-known Ninth Circuit decision.
166
Without this 
check on copyright owner discretion, takedown notice abuse will become 
even more of a problem than it already is.
Although the Study claimed that it was not recommending “wholesale 
changes” to § 512, it invited Congress to “fine-tune” many aspects of the 
safe harbor provisions to tilt the balance in the direction that copyright in-
dustries have requested.
167
In most respects, the proposed changes would, in 
fact, radically alter the DMCA safe harbors.
168
Although the Study declined 
to recommend enactment of an Article 17-like notice-and-staydown rule, as 
some copyright industry players had urged, it recommended further study of 
notice-and-staydown rules as well as no-fault site-blocking injunctions.
169
In some respects, the Copyright Office Section 512 Study is actually 
worse for most ISPs than Article 17. After all, Article 17 only applies to for-
profit online content sharing services that make available, organize, and 
promote “large” amounts of user-uploaded content. At least some smaller 
entities are exempt from Article 17, as are nonprofit online encyclopedias, 
educational and scientific repositories, and open source software developing 
and sharing sites, as well as providers of electronic communication services, 
online marketplaces, business-to-business cloud services, and cloud services 
that allow users to upload content for their own use.
170
The Section 512 
Study, by contrast, recommended imposing greater obligations on all ISPs, 
165. Id. at 152–55.
166. Id. at 148–52. The Study faults the Ninth Circuit for concluding otherwise in Lenz 
v. Universal Music Group, Inc., 815 F.2d 1145 (9th Cir. 2016). See SECTION 512 STUDY, su-
pra note 14, at 148–49.
167. Id. at 7, 198.
168. The Study’s recommended changes to the standards of ISP knowledge about users’
infringements would profoundly change the safe harbors, as would its recommendations to 
contract the categories of ISPs eligible for safe harbors. Id. at 84–95, 111–26. As Jonathan 
Berroya of the Internet Association put the point, “the cumulative effect of the changes rec-
ommended by the [Study] would be to disrupt the balance established by Congress in Section 
512 to the detriment of Internet users, including businesses and individual creators.” DMCA’s
Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 7 (statement of Jonathan Berroya, then-
Interim President and CEO, Internet Association).
169. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 186–96.
170. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 2(6).
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although occasionally suggesting that smaller entities may have lesser bur-
dens when it comes to monitoring user-uploaded content.
171
In contrast to the Section 512 Study’s quite dismissive treatment of fair 
uses,
172
Article 17 requires member states to ensure that fundamental user 
freedoms will be respected even when a hosting service uses automated 
content recognition technologies. It directed members states to ensure the 
preservation of user-generated content that quotes from or parodies other 
works under copyright exceptions.
173
B. The DMCA Safe Harbors Have Enabled U.S.-Based ISPs to Thrive
The Section 512 Study understated the importance of the DMCA safe 
harbors for small and medium-sized U.S.-based ISPs, as documented in the 
seminal empirical study authored by Professor Jennifer Urban, et al., Notice 
and Takedown in Everyday Practice.174 That report concluded that the ma-
jority of ISPs that host user contents are “DMCA Classic” platforms. These 
ISPs follow the protocol that § 512(c) establishes: after receiving notices 
from copyright owners about specific claimed infringements on the ISP’s
site, the ISPs investigate and take down or disable access to infringing mate-
rials on their sites.
175
For small and medium-sized companies, this notice-
and-takedown process is a burden, but their staff members dutifully review 
the notices individually and comply with valid takedowns, as the law re-
quires.
176
The DMCA Classic ISPs depend heavily on the § 512(c) safe har-
bor for their very existence. These ISPs are, moreover, not the sources of 
significant infringements; they take very seriously their responsibilities to 
process takedown notices in the manner that Congress expected with adopt-
ing the DMCA.
177
They do not automatically take down user-uploaded con-
tent if the takedown notice they receive from a rights holder or its agent is 
flawed, as often happens.
171. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 123–24.
172. The Study would relieve copyright owners of the responsibility to consider fair use 
before sending takedown notices and criticized ISPs that decide to allow a challenged use to 
remain on their sites because the use was fair and non-infringing. Id. at 150–55.
173. DSM Directive, supra note 11, art. 17(7). In its discussion of the DSM Directive, 
the Section 512 Study does not mention Article 17’s commitment to allowing users to exer-
cise fundamental freedoms in creating works they upload to sharing service sites. SECTION 
512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 61–63.
174. JENNIFER URBAN ET AL., NOTICE AND TAKEDOWN IN EVERYDAY PRACTICE 73
(2016). The report’s findings were also published in digested, updated versions. See Jennifer 
M. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown: Online Service Provider and Rightsholder Accounts of 
Everyday Practice, 64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 371 (2017) [hereinafter Urban et al., Notice 
and Takedown]; Jennifer M. Urban et al., Takedown in Two Worlds: An Empirical Analysis,
64 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 483 (2017).
175. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown, supra note 174, at 381. ISPs report that many
of the takedown notices they get are unsound. Id. at 381, 385–88.
176. Id. at 398.
177. Id.; see also Hinze, supra note 38, ch. 8.
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The Urban Study analyzed a six-month sample of takedown notices and 
reported that a high proportion—nearly one-third—were flawed, either be-
cause the takedown notice was incomplete or fraudulent, the uploaded mate-
rial was fair use, or the notice provider was not the owner of a copyright al-
leged to be infringed.
178
Numerous other submissions to the Copyright 
Office during the Section 512 Study process also documented these abus-
es.
179
The Study cited “a series of extensively researched articles” in the 
Wall Street Journal reporting on takedown abuses, one of which pointed out 
that Google had reinstated more than 50,000 wrongfully removed links.
180
Nevertheless, the Study concluded that “[b]ecause much of the data relating 
to notice-and-takedown requests is not public, it is difficult to ascertain the 
extent to which some of these examples are representative of what’s hap-
pening in the section 512 ecosystem.”
181
It seemed to accept uncritically as-
sertions of copyright industry representatives that abusive notices are “in-
credibly rare.”
182
Unlike their smaller counterparts, dominant platforms such as YouTube 
and Facebook will be able to adapt to whatever ISP liability rules Congress 
might choose to adopt. These platforms and other large ISPs have sought to 
be more than DMCA-compliant by automating their handling of thousands 
or even millions of notices sent to the platforms by bots and takedowns for 
unlawful uploads.
183
Some large platforms (notably YouTube) go well be-
yond what the DMCA requires by developing or licensing filtering technol-
ogies, offering special takedown procedures for trusted rights holders, hash-
matching based “stay down” systems, as well as agreeing to contractual 
terms that place additional obligations on these ISPs.
184
YouTube and Facebook greatly benefited in their early years from the 
existence of the DMCA and the EU’s E-Commerce safe harbors which ena-
bled them to become dominant platforms. Now that they have achieved 
178. Urban et al., supra note 174, at 88; see also DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hear-
ing, supra note 16, at 3–9 (statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Public Knowledge).
179. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 146–47 nn.784–87.
180. Andrea Fuller et al., Google Hides News, Tricked by Fake Claims, WALL ST. J.
(May 15, 2020), https://www.wsj.com/articles/googledmca-copyright-claims-takedown-
online-reputation-11589557001, cited in SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 148 n.790. 
The Office noted that “[s]uch abuses of the DMCA system do call for some enforcement 
mechanism,” but it offered no recommendations about this. See also DMCA’s Notice-and-
Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 3–9 (statement of Meredith Rose, Policy Counsel, Pub-
lic Knowledge) (criticizing the Study for its failure to give credence to ISP complaints about 
“bad” notices).
181. SECTION 512 STUDY, supra note 14, at 147.
182. Id. at 148.
183. Urban et al., Notice and Takedown, supra note 174, at 382.
184. Id. at 382–83 (describing “DMCA Plus” OSPs); see, e.g., Videos Removed 
or Blocked Due to YouTube’s Contractual Obligations, YOUTUBE HELP, 
https://support.google.com/youtube/answer/3045545 (describing YouTube agreements with 
certain music rights holders requiring specific takedown obligations).
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dominance, they may benefit further if legislatures change the DMCA rules 
in a way that would, in effect, pull the ladder up behind them. Indeed, the 
dominance of these mega-platforms would be further entrenched if new 
regulations put small and medium-sized platforms at a disadvantage or even 
cause them to fold.
185
The Section 512 Study failed to acknowledge how important U.S.-
based internet companies, including online platforms, have become to the 
U.S. economy. A study conducted for the Internet Association reported that 
this sector contributed more than $2 trillion to the U.S. gross domestic 
product (GDP) in 2018, said to represent about 10% of GDP.
186
That study 
also reported that this sector directly created six million jobs and indirectly 
supported an additional 13 million jobs in the United States.
187
A Bureau of 
Economic Analysis study of the U.S. digital economy for the U.S. Depart-
ment of Commerce estimated that this sector contributed $1.35 trillion to the 
economy in 2017, or 6.9% of GDP.
188
In the Forbes 2019 ranking of the 
world’s top 100 digital companies, U.S.-based firms dominated the top ten 
and comprised nearly half of the top 25.
189
ISPs, including platforms that en-
able user uploads, are among the many types of information technology 
firms that make up this sector. All but five of the top 20 internet companies 
measured by market value are U.S.-based firms.
190
The success of the U.S. 
internet economy is due in no small measure to the DMCA safe harbor 
regulations.
191
185. See, e.g., Hannah Bloch-Wehba, Automation in Moderation, 53 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 41, 67, 71 (2020); see also DMCA at 22 Hearing, supra note 16, at 1–2 (statement of Re-
becca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Harvard University).
186. Christopher Hooton, Measuring the US Internet Sector: 2019, INTERNET ASS’N
(Sept. 26, 2019), https://internetassociation.org/publications/measuring-us-internet-sector-
2019. The Internet Association is a trade association representing leading global internet com-
panies. Id. at 20 (listing member companies including major U.S.-based companies).
187. Id.
188. Digital Economy Accounted for 6.9 Percent of GDP in 2017, BUREAU OF ECON.
ANALYSIS (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.bea.gov/news/blog/2019-04-04/digital-economy-
accounted-69-percent-gdp-2017.
189. See Top 100 Digital Companies: 2019 Ranking, FORBES (Oct. 2019), 
https://www.forbes.com/top-digital-companies/list/#tab:rank. Only three of the top 25 were 
EU-based, the highest ranked at #19. See also TOP 100 GLOBAL TECH LEADERS REPORT,
THOMSON REUTERS (Jan. 2018), https://www.thomsonreuters.com/content/dam/ewp-m
/documents/thomsonreuters/en/pdf/reports/thomson-reuters-top-100-global-tech-leaders-
report.pdf (showing 45 of the top technology companies worldwide are U.S.-based, while only 
8 are EU-based).
190. J. Clement, Market Capitalization of the Biggest Internet Companies Worldwide as 
of June 2019, STATISTA (June 23, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483
/market-value-of-the-largest-internet-companies-worldwide/ [https://web.archive.org/web
/20210129222447/https://www.statista.com/statistics/277483/market-value-of-the-largest-
internet-companies-worldwide/]. Along with the U.S.-based companies listed are several 
companies based in China; none are EU-based. Id.
191. See, e.g., David Kravets, 10 Years Later, Misunderstood DMCA Is the Law That 
Saved the Web, WIRED (Oct. 27, 2000), https://www.wired.com/2008/10/ten-years-later (“To-
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Few of the top internet companies are EU-based. When adopting Arti-
cle 17, EU policymakers did not consider the likely competition and innova-
tion consequences of the DSM Directive, especially the significant market 
entry barriers for EU-based ISPs it would erect. Perhaps EU policymakers 
have given up on being able to nurture European platforms to compete with 
successful U.S.-based firms. Either that or these policymakers were oblivi-
ous to the impacts that Article 17 and similar rules would have on competi-
tion and innovation in online content hosting markets. The Commission’s
main goal with Article 17 seems to have been to enable EU rights holders to 
extract rents from existing U.S.-based mega-platforms, not to provide incen-
tives for new EU-based platforms to compete with the mega-platforms or 
innovate around them.
192
C. The U.S. Safe Harbor Regime Has Fostered an Unprecedented 
Outpouring of Creative Content
In considering any DMCA reforms, Congress should consider not only 
the implications for competition and innovation in the U.S.-based internet 
sector, but also the interests of scholars and other researchers who are now 
widely posting their research online on an open access basis and the mil-
lions of user-creators and their audiences who rely on the services that ISPs 
provide.
193
In proposing to refashion the safe harbors to give much greater protec-
tion to copyright industries, the Section 512 Study gave essentially no 
weight to the interests of internet users or to the tremendous creative output 
of user-creators. According to a recent report, almost 312 million U.S. resi-
dents are internet users
194
and almost 70% of them use social networks of 
day’s internet is largely an outgrowth of the much-reviled [DMCA] that lawmakers passed in 
1998 . . . .”); see also Susanna Monseau, Fostering Web 2.0 Innovation: The Role of the Judi-
cial Interpretation of the DMCA Safe Harbors, Secondary Liability and Fair Use, 12 J.
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 70, 106 (2012) (citation omitted) (“The extraordinary and 
unprecedented growth in innovative Internet services is only possible because of the 
DMCA.”).
192. See also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 2 (Julia Reda, 
Former Member of the European Parliament & Fellow, Berkman Klein Center for Internet &
Society, Harvard University) (describing the primary objective of Article 17 as encouraging 
improved licensing for rightsholders).
193. See DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 2–3 (statement of 
David Hansen, Lead Copyright & Information Policy Officer, Duke University); DMCA’s
Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra, at 3–5 (statement of Abigail Rives, IP Counsel, En-
gine).
194. J. Clement, Number of Internet Users in the United States from 2000 to 2019,
STATISTA (Jan. 7, 2020), https://www.statista.com/statistics/276445/number-of-internet-users-
in-the-united-states. As a consequence of the coronavirus pandemic, these figures on internet 
usage may well be even more substantial.
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various kinds.
195
UGC on these networks have prodigiously proliferated to 
become a hallmark of the digital age.
196
Most of the UGC uploaded to social 
media sites are wholly original creations of the uploaders, including their 
photographs of sunsets and videos of cats and dogs. Remixes and mashups 
typically draw upon existing works, transforming them so as to convey a 
different message.
197
Millions of user-creators have been able to commer-
cialize their products with the aid of ISP hosting sites. In 2017, “nearly 17 
million Americans earned a collective $6.8 billion in income by posting 
their personal creations on nine internet platforms.”
198
Etsy, for instance, at 
the end of 2019 had almost 65 million items for sale, with 2.5 million active 
sellers and 45.7 million active buyers.
199
The authors of these works are eve-
ry bit as deserving of copyright protection as the authors of Hollywood 
movies, top-selling sound recordings, and best-selling novels. The Copy-
right Office’s Section 512 Study did not even acknowledge that UGC crea-
tors’ interests in making their works available through online sharing plat-
forms should be taken into account as part of the overall balance.
A staggering number of UGC videos are uploaded to YouTube and 
photographs to Instagram every day.
200
However, many less-well-known 
UGC sites also host large quantities of such works. Consider, for instance, 
the Organization for Transformative Works. It has more than one million 
registered users, hosts more than four million works, and gets an average of 
1.12 billion page-views per month.
201
Another example is Automattic, the 
U.S.-based internet company behind WordPress, Tumblr, and other plat-
forms, which offered the following data when submitting comments to the 
Copyright Office for its § 512 study: in one month in 2016, WordPress users 
created more than one million new websites, made 17 million blog posts, 
195. J. Clement, Number of Social Network Users in the United States from 2017 to 
2023, STATISTA (Dec. 2, 2019), https://www.statista.com/statistics/278409/number-of-social-
network-users-in-the-united-states (forecasting based on 2017–18 survey).
196. See, e.g., DEP’T OF COMMERCE, INTERNET POLICY TASK FORCE, WHITE PAPER ON 
REMIXES, FIRST SALE, AND STATUTORY DAMAGES 6 (2016), https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files
/ntia/publications/white_paper_remixes-first_sale-statutory_damages_jan_2016.pdf. Stake-
holders have different perspectives on remixes and mashups. Id. at 6–9.
197. See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REMIX: MAKING ART AND COMMERCE THRIVE IN 
THE HYBRID ECONOMY 14 (2008).
198. DMCA’s Notice-and-Takedown Hearing, supra note 16, at 4 (statement of Abigail 
Rives, IP Counsel, Engine).
199. See id.
200. See, e.g., Mitja Rutnik, YouTube in Numbers, ANDROID AUTHORITY (Aug. 11, 
2019), https://www.androidauthority.com/youtube-stats-1016070 (reporting that more than 
500 hours of content is uploaded to YouTube every minute); Instagram by the Numbers,
OMNICORE (Feb. 10, 2020), https://www.omnicoreagency.com/instagram-statistics (reporting 
that more than 100 million photos and videos are uploaded to Instagram every day).
201. DMCA at 22 Hearing, supra note 16, at 1 (statement of Rebecca Tushnet, Professor 
of Law, Harvard University).
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and uploaded more than 34 million individual media files.
202
The creators of 
these works are authors within the meaning of U.S. copyright law, and a 
great many of them have decided to share their works with others under 
Creative Commons (CC) or similar licenses.
203
Indeed, Creative Commons, 
in its State of the Commons 2017 report, claimed 1.4 billion works of au-
thorship were covered by CC licenses.
204
Insofar as members of Congress consider revisiting the DMCA safe 
harbors for online hosting ISPs, they should give due consideration to the 
interests of these creators, the audiences these creators are reaching, and 
U.S. leadership in the internet and technology industries, as well as the in-
terests of major copyright industry firms. Maintaining a reasonable balance 
among these various interests is essential if any copyright reform is to be 
politically feasible, let alone wise.
Another failure of the Copyright Office’s Section 512 Study lies in its 
ignoring that U.S.-based copyright industries have been thriving in the in-
ternet age.
205
The Study mostly sympathized with content industries’ charac-
terization of the current state of copyright as primarily one of massive harm, 
without weighing the tremendous extent of creative innovation made possi-
ble in the digital age. While online infringement remains a real problem at 
scale, especially from offshore streaming sites, it is undeniable that there is 
an immensely greater availability of legitimate online content today via 
online streaming and download services as compared with 1998. These ser-
vices have drawn large audiences of subscribers in the United States and 
abroad.
An important early step in this direction was Apple’s deal with the re-
cording industry to license digital music for its iTunes service so that con-
sumers who wanted to lawfully acquire music could do so conveniently and 
at a modest price-point.
206
Spotify, Pandora, and TIDAL are among the enti-
202. Automattic Inc., Comment Letter on U.S. Copyright Office Section 512 Study at 2 
(Apr. 7, 2016) [hereinafter Automattic Comments] http://copyright.gov/policy/section512. In 
that period, Wordpress.com received 541 notices of claimed infringement, to which it strives 
to respond within 48 hours. Id.
203. See, e.g., LESSIG, supra note 197, at 17, 227.
204. Ryan Merkley, A Transformative Year: State of the Commons 2017, CREATIVE 
COMMONS (May 8, 2018), https://creativecommons.org/2018/05/08/state-of-the-commons-
2017.
205. See generally, JOEL WALDFOGEL, DIGITAL RENAISSANCE (2019). The book’s eco-
nomic forecasts must be somewhat discounted, as they predate the onset of the coronavirus 
pandemic.
206. See, e.g., Steve Knopper, iTunes’ 10th Anniversary: How Steve Jobs Turned the 
Industry Upside Down, ROLLING STONE (Apr. 26, 2013), https://www.rollingstone.com
/culture/culture-news/itunes-10th-anniversary-how-steve-jobs-turned-the-industry-upside-
down-68985.
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ties that have subsequently obtained licenses to popular recorded music.
207
Spotify, for example, touts 271 million active monthly users, 124 million of 
whom pay for the service.
208
Amazon and Sirius XM also provide members 
of the public with access to millions of songs for modest subscription 
fees.
209
The upshot is that hundreds of millions of users now have lawful ac-
cess to an almost unimaginably rich array of digital music and other content 
through these new digital services.
210
Several recent studies have charted the successes of creative industries 
that have adopted profitable new business models and ways of making con-
tent, both old and new, available on the internet, resulting in a new golden 
age of creativity. Indeed, a 2019 report on the state of the entertainment in-
dustry concluded that “the internet, as currently structured, has been a crea-
tive force. It has helped many more people become creators and to make 
money from their creations, and the many industry sectors around ‘copy-
right’ are all seeing the fruits of that now.”
211
Even some content industries
that once were struggling are presently thriving. Although newspapers, es-
pecially local news publications, may be an exception to the overall trend, 
their decline is not due to rampant copyright infringement.
Like the music industry, other entertainment sectors are experiencing 
success with new digital content in addition to traditional forms of produc-
tion and distribution, with growing or steady employment in these sectors as 
well. For example, film, television, and streaming video, including UGC, 
are benefiting from significant expansions in investment, content creation, 
and consumer consumption and spending, particularly as the numbers of 
cord-cutting video streaming subscribers continues to grow.
212
The market 
for books, e-books, and audiobooks has been growing at a steady pace, 
207. See, e.g., Craig Grannell, A History of Music Streaming, DYNAUDIO (May 
16, 2018), https://www.dynaudio.com/dynaudio-academy/2018/may/a-history-of-music-
streaming.
208. Company Info, SPOTIFY, https://newsroom.spotify.com/company-info (last visited 
Mar. 07, 2021).
209. See, e.g., Sarah Perez, Paid Streaming Music Subscriptions in US Top 60 Million, 
Says RIAA, TECHCRUNCH (Sept. 6, 2019), https://techcrunch.com/2019/09/06/paid-streaming-
music-subscriptions-in-u-s-top-60m-says-riaa.
210. See, e.g., IFPI Global Music Report 2019, IFPI (Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.ifpi.org
/news/IFPI-GLOBAL-MUSIC-REPORT-2019 (reporting global recorded music revenues up 
9.7% over the previous year, streaming revenues up 34%, and paid subscription revenues up 
almost 33%). See also Copyright in Foreign Jurisdictions Hearing, supra note 3, at 2–3
(statement of Matt Schruers, President, Computer & Communications Industry Association).
211. MICHAEL MASNICK & LEIGH BEADON, THE SKY IS RISING: A DETAILED LOOK AT 
THE STATE OF THE ENTERTAINMENT INDUSTRY 41–42 (2019), https://skyisrising.com
/TheSkyIsRising2019.pdf; see also DMCA at 22 Hearing, supra note 16, at 4–5 (statement of 
Rebecca Tushnet, Professor of Law, Harvard University) (citing statistics from the Masnick & 
Beadon study, id.).
212. MASNICK & BEADON, supra note 211, at 13–24.
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along with a big increase in self-publishing.
213
The video game sector, which 
includes mobile gaming, live game streaming, and e-sports, is rapidly ex-
panding with no signs of slowing.
214
Economist Joel Waldfogel’s study of the impact of digitization on crea-
tive industries looked at sales and other data from the previous decade.
215
Waldfogel found that digital technology has enabled industries to reduce 
production costs for content and distribution while at the same time main-
taining the quality of creative output.
216
Furthermore, a 2018 WIPO study on creators’ income in the digital age 
found that wage trends for creative workers generally outperformed other 
sectors, losing less or even gaining a better income position than other 
workers.
217
It corroborates findings by Waldfogel and others that digitization 
has lowered content generation costs as well as market entry costs.
218
The 
study concludes: “From a policy perspective, these results do not lend sup-
port to the idea that creators’ income situation has systematically worsened 
with the rise of the internet and its intermediaries, as argued by some com-
mentators in ‘value gap’ discussions.”
219
This good news for major copyright industries has happened during the 
two-plus decades since the DMCA safe harbor regime was enacted.
D. The DMCA Safe Harbors Have Fostered First Amendment Freedoms
Another failing of the Section 512 Study is its dismissive attitude about 
ways in which the DMCA safe harbors have promoted freedom of speech 
and freedom of expression on the internet. Any reform of the DMCA safe 
harbors should weigh heavily the public interests in First Amendment free-
doms that online hosting ISPs have enabled. In its Comment to the Copy-
right Office in connection with its § 512 study, Automattic observed:
Safe harbor from allegations of infringement arising out of materi-
als posted by others is foundational to the Internet as we know it. 
As the Supreme Court explained in Reno v. American Civil Liber-
ties Union, 521 U.S. 844 (1997), the Internet democratizes access 
to speech by allowing every user to speak to—and be heard by—
every other connected user:
213. Id. at 25–31.
214. Id. at 32–40.
215. WALDFOGEL, supra note 205.
216. Id. at 252–53; see also MASNICK & BEADON, supra note 211, at 7, 12.
217. Alexander Cuntz, Creators’ Income Situation in the Digital Age 46 (WIPO, Eco-
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Through the use of chat rooms, any person with a phone line 
can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther than 
it could from any soapbox. Through the use of Web pages, mail 
exploders, and newsgroups, the same individual can become a 
pamphleteer.
Id. at 870 (citation omitted). That democratization would simply be 
impossible if all content had to be checked for copyright infringe-
ment before it was posted—which would be the ultimate result if 
there were no safe harbors.
220
Changes to the DMCA safe harbor rules should be crafted to promote, 
not to restrain or impede, freedom of speech, expression, and assembly, 
which are essential components of the democratic principles that define the 
United States as a nation.
Conclusion
Congress should be wary of any changes to the current DMCA safe 
harbor rule that could have substantial negative impacts on ISPs, whether 
small, medium-sized, or established mega-platforms, in addition to the mil-
lions of U.S.-based internet creators whose online content is widely enjoyed 
by the hundreds of millions of internet users who are constituents of every 
member of Congress. As some relatively small U.S.-based internet plat-
forms stated in a letter to members of the EU Parliament about the DSM Di-
rective’s proposals, “[a]ny reform of copyright laws must consider the im-
pact it will have on small internet platforms like ours and the creators that 
depend on us.”
221
U.S. internet policy has been and should continue to be pro-competitive 
and pro-innovation. It has been the policy of every administration, both Re-
publican and Democratic, that the DMCA notice-and-takedown rules pro-
mote the welfare of U.S. industries and internet users. This is why these 
administrations have also exported these rules to other countries. The Unit-
ed States should aim to retain its leadership in the global arena in the devel-
opment of sound copyright law and policy in the digital era, not cede it to 
EU policymakers who have formulated such a flawed regime as Article 17.
The Copyright Office had the opportunity to present a neutral, well-
balanced perspective on the current state of ISP copyright liability rules, but 
220. Automattic Comments, supra note 202, at 1; see also Sag, supra note 92, at 518 
(discussing the democratizing effect of an open internet on expression and creativity).
221. Letter from Online Creator Platforms on Article 13, ENGINE (Sept. 10, 2018), 
https://www.engine.is/news/category/creatorplatformsarticle13 (letter sent to Member of the 
European Parliament on behalf of Automattic, Bandcamp, Kickstarter, Medium, Patreon, and 
Shapeways regarding the precursor to Article 17).
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it failed to do so. Instead, it focused too narrowly on the complaints of copy-
right industries about ISPs at the expense of user-creators and the greater 
public interest. Congress should not forget that only by retaining a balanced 
perspective including the interests of all relevant stakeholders and uphold-
ing fundamental freedoms can U.S. copyright legislation adhere to its con-
stitutional mandate to promote the “progress of Science” in the digital age.

